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Abstract 
This thesis reconstructs the concept of International Non-Governmental Organization 
(INGO) accountability to beneficiaries through the development of a strategic model for 
INGO accountability to beneficiaries. It works through the history and arguments 
surrounding the rise of the debate around whether INGOs should be held accountable to 
their beneficiary populations. Unique definitions are developed for the terms and 
concepts related to this topic and a framework for understanding the strategic model for 
INGO accountability to beneficiaries is outlined: Accountable to whom? Accountable for 
what? Accountable how? A practical example of an internal assessment for measuring an 
INGO’s accountability to beneficiaries is examined, analyzing data from Mercy Corps’ 
internal accountability to beneficiaries survey conducted in 2010. This thesis defines 
accountability to beneficiaries as the process of justifying and being responsible for the 
manner and results of one’s actions to any individual or group who is a member of the 
society whose interests the project or program is intended to promote. The main 
conclusions from this thesis are that the traditional model should be expanded to be more 
strategic and include a) a broader beneficiary and stakeholder population who may be 
affected, either positively or negatively, by the actions of an INGO, b) the actions of all 
members of the organization, and c) the enduring impacts of their work over time. 
Accountability to beneficiaries is a concept that can be applied to all INGO projects in a 
way that requires minimal resources and will ultimately improve the quality of the 
services delivered.   
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Forward 
"Be not simply good – be good for something” Henry Thoreau  
  
 In 2005 as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Guinea, West Africa I frequently visited 
the small village of Tolo where a defunct chicken farm stood at the outskirts of town 
along the main road. All that remained of the once grandiose farm was empty concrete 
office spaces, dilapidated chicken coops, and a large “Provided by the American People” 
USAID sign at the gate. I asked the villagers about the project and they told me that some 
foreigners set up a chicken farm, but they only trained people from Mamou, the nearest 
mid-sized town how to use the farm. From what I could tell the farm was supposed to 
help with food security and generate income for villagers by providing chickens and 
eggs. Once the project funding had ended and the foreigners left, the Mamou citizens 
took most of the chickens and left the village of Tolo as it had been before. Children now 
occasionally used the farm for play, but it otherwise sat unused. The animals that were 
left gradually died off and the supply of eggs ended. Why? I inquired. No one seemed to 
know. I never had the opportunity to see official reports about this project and news about 
it never appeared in the media. These observations early on in my career in international 
development have shaped how I personally evaluate the impact of projects – the 
community and stakeholder’s perceptions before, during, and after the project.  
 I chose to pursue a graduate degree in political science to learn more about the 
structures and institutions that often take the fall for holding back development projects 
from alleviating poverty. In 2010, in conjuncture with a PSU collaboration with the Ho 
Chi Minh National University for Politics and Public Administration, I surveyed 
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development professionals in Hanoi about their perceptions of the monitoring and 
evaluation systems they were using. Overwhelmingly, respondents who were not 
monitoring and evaluation experts said that they felt their systems were cumbersome and 
required additional work with little additional return.  
 All of these events led to the formulation of this thesis topic, accountability to 
beneficiaries. In order for international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to be 
effective and efficient at achieving their intended impact, a careful analysis of 
accountability to beneficiaries is an essential first step. Survey data from Mercy Corps, an 
international NGO (INGO), about staff perceptions of accountability to beneficiaries 
from 35 countries will be presented to serve as a real-world example. This data was 
compiled from a survey conducted by Mercy Corps and analyzed by the author 
independently as well as part of an agency working group.     
 Accountability is not a topic that is specific to the aid industry. It is a more 
general issue across all types of organizations. We can be held accountable in our 
personal relationships as well. Our loved ones can ask us to give an account of our 
actions. When we come clean with our actions to our loved ones, difficult as it can be, 
this is the feeling of accountability. Scaling this idea up to an organization is difficult 
because it requires each individual within the organization to be accountable for their 
professional, and occasionally personal, actions – this is systematic accountability. 
 During my graduate coursework I was consistently frustrated by the use of 
theories that I found detached from the developing countries where I work, which has 
pushed my thesis writing into more of the policy science arena. I wrote this thesis under 
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the guidance of two political science professors and one public administration professor. 
My hope is that with their support, this thesis will present a practical lens on a theoretical 
problem, ultimately leaving my main subject, INGOs, with a pragmatic approach to 
improving accountability to beneficiaries.  
 Before I was able to complete and defend this thesis I began a new position with 
Mercy Corps in Haiti managing at first one and then, a bit later, two field offices in St. 
Marc and Mirebalais. My experiences in Haiti have greatly colored the final perspective I 
have stamped on this work. Chapter three, which is focused on the theoretical and 
scholarly debate on the topic was re-written to reflect my surroundings in Haiti. Life in 
post-earthquake Haiti is a perfect trial ground for this topic because there is an abundance 
of money being poured into “building back better” as many aid workers like to say. 
Despite all of this funding, my surroundings are squalid – it’s impossible to disembark 
from the airplane without noticing that the airport itself remains cracked and blue-tarp 
tents cover nearly every inch of available space from the airport to the outskirts of town. 
From my experiences in Haiti, I am affirmed of the need to think harder on the topic of 
accountability to beneficiaries and I hope this thesis is a good step towards improving this 
vital component of aid and development work. No longer can the aid industry rely on 
complacent methods of accountability, what I’m calling Traditional Accountability to 
Beneficiaries (TAB), they must listen harder to the needs of the communities and use 
more innovative Strategic Accountability to Beneficiaries (SAB) tools and practices. My 
experience as an aid worker also helps me understand just how difficult it can be to first 
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get results and more importantly be held accountable for those results, whatever they may 
be. 
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Chapter 1. Background and Topic Defense 
Before World War II, the nation-state had been the primary actor in global 
governance. Afterwards with the expansion of actors in the international arena such as 
the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) (later became the World Bank), as well as 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), global governance became more 
of a shared responsibility between these international organizations, non-state actors and 
their state counterparts, graphically represented below in Figure 1. This trend has 
continued through the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, displaying a shifting of power 
in world politics away from the nation-state
1
. Spruyt and Evans, among other scholars, 
argue that while other actors may be rising in power, the state remains the most powerful 
actor in the international system. Global governance has shifted in the modern era into a 
networked system, with a plethora of actors contributing to decisions affecting 
populations beyond their own borders. These actors are distinguished by the “centrality 
of principled ideas or values motivating their formation”2. Transnationalism, a common 
theory in international relations, explains this organizational shift in power from a 
hierarchical system to one that is more dispersed
3
. Non-state actors have benefited from 
this shift in structure by gaining increased power within the international system. With 
                                                          
1
 Ahmed, Shamina and David Potter, NGOs in International Politics (West Hartford, Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 2006), 24.  
2
 Keck, Margaret, and Kathryn Sikkink,  Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 3.  
3
Ahmed, Shamina and David Potter, NGOs in International Politics (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian 
Press, 2006),13. 
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this increase of power also comes the increase of responsibility and the call for 
accountability.  
 
Figure 1. "(Mis) Managing the World?" Relationships between the main players on the 21st century 
international political stage
4
 
 
At the same time, globalization has increased the interconnectedness of states. 
Issues such as climate change, refugee and other population flows across borders, and the 
need for fossil fuels, has made all states reliant upon each other. These and other 
transnational problems have increased the need for stronger international actors as 
individual states alone cannot solve these issues. This evolution in the role of the state 
made room for the growth of INGOs, not-for-profit organizations separate from the 
government that seek to advance certain conceptions of the public interest through 
                                                          
4
 Held, David and Anthony McGrew, Globalization/Anti-Globalization. (Massachusetts: Polity Press, 
2002), 66.   
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transnational activities. The interconnectedness of individuals across borders, the speed at 
which information can travel, and the rise in media coverage of human suffering from 
natural disasters, wars, and disease has increased the willingness of states to come to the 
aid of suffering people around the globe. Response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake set a 
new record of more than 3.5 billion USD pledged to the emergency response
5
. As states 
are seen to be less able to deliver aid in a non-political manner, INGOs have been 
increasingly called upon to carry out transnational aid operations, from emergency relief, 
to agriculture development to youth employment projects. At the time of the 2010 
earthquake in Haiti, 80% of all aid to Haiti and 90% of all US aid to Haiti was being 
channeled through INGOs, local NGOs, and contractors
6
.  
As the foreign aid and assistance industry has matured and expanded, there have 
been increasing calls for INGOs to be held more accountable for their actions. As global 
governance arrangements have shifted, democratic accountability has not spread as easily 
in this network and only weak, if any, formal accountability mechanisms exist
7
. Donors 
have increased regulation, often in a reactionary manner, instituting increased monitoring 
and/or evaluation requirements. Since INGOs base their legitimacy largely on the 
premise that they are accountable to the populations they serve, especially the poor, it 
                                                          
5
 “UN OCHA Reports,” last modified Jan. 28, 2012. 
http://fts.unocha.org/reports/daily/OCHA_R24_E15797.XLS 
6
 Lawry, Steven, “Paul Farmer’s Call for a New Conversation on Aid to Haiti,” review of Haiti: After the 
Earthquake, by Paul Farmer. http://hausercenter.org/iha/2011/12/09/paul-farmer%E2%80%99s-call-for-a-
new-conversation-on-aid-to-haiti/ 
7
 Scholte, Jan Aart, “Civil Society and Democratically Accountable Global Governance.” In Global 
Governancce and Public Accountability, edited Held and Koening-Archibugi, 87-109 (Massachusettes: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 87. 
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seems natural that mechanisms would be designed to measure these claims
8
. Yet citizens 
have little to no access to redress in the globalized system. Increased surveillance over 
the actions of INGOs increases with each large-scale humanitarian disaster; the Rwandan 
genocide in 1994, Kosovo in 1999, the Indonesian tsunami in 2004, the Myanmar 
cyclone of 2008, and the Haitian earthquake in 2010 have each renewed the debate about 
how INGOs are held accountable for their actions. Both cases of INGO intervention, 
such as after a natural disaster, and non-intervention, the Rwandan genocide for example, 
have brought up the discussion about the role, responsibility, and accountability of 
INGOs. States have also pushed back against the loss of their sovereignty as INGOs and 
foreign assistance donors expand their influence. States receiving aid inherently 
relinquish parts of their sovereignty in order to accept assistance from non-state actors. 
While many INGO activities may appear at first to be non-political, such as delivering 
health services or providing clean drinking water, these activities are all replacing the 
role of the government, further eroding state sovereignty; a point that INGOs frequently 
debate. Local populations are also increasingly making demands for improved delivery of 
aid. INGOs then find themselves being pressed from both sides to improve their work 
and be more accountable in both directions. Within the aid community there is also peer 
pressure to enact and strengthen accountability practices and accept democratic norms.  
INGOs have no legal accountability to their beneficiaries. However, there is a 
moral obligation for the INGO to provide the best possible services to the beneficiaries 
they are serving, regardless of how strong the mechanisms may be to bind the INGO to 
                                                          
8
 Edwards, Michael and David Hulme, eds., Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and 
Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1996), 14. 
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these obligations. INGOs play a role in the cosmopolitan society to share the functions of 
government and provide public goods. The government is the party generally considered 
accountable for the provision of these public goods. As INGOs have increasingly 
provided these goods and services, they could also be considered to now need to be held 
accountable for these actions, just as the government is.  
The concept of holding an INGO accountable to their beneficiaries is a rather new 
and contested concept. This thesis will rethink and reconstruct the concept of INGO 
accountability to beneficiaries by exploring two main questions: first of all, what is the 
best model of accountability to beneficiaries that can be used to generate accountability 
tools that serve the strategic aims of an INGO? Secondly, what is the role of internal 
assessment tools within the overall accountability to beneficiaries model? This thesis 
compares the traditional or contemporary thinking about INGO accountability to 
beneficiaries with a strategic model.  
INGOs have developed tools and practices to deal with this pressure, yet despite 
these efforts, criticism of the sector continues. This thesis explores this idea by 
acknowledging the efforts made by INGOs to achieve more accountable impact as the 
traditional accountability to beneficiaries (TAB) approach. The new ideas put forth here 
are referred to as the strategic accountability to beneficiaries (SAB) approach.  
Accountability is often thought of in terms of elected public officials being held 
accountable to the people who elected them. However, the term originates from its Latin 
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root “computare” or “to count” and was used predominantly in finance until the 1980’s9. 
In modern social science literature, accountability means the process of justifying and 
being responsible for the manner and results of one’s actions to relevant stakeholders. 
States were previously assumed to be accountable to their populations by virtue that 
governments stayed in power as long as their populations felt they were sufficiently 
providing for their needs. Accountability relationships are slightly different for INGOs, 
who juggle the twin obligations to their donors and the populations they are trying to 
reach, the beneficiaries. For this thesis, a beneficiary is broadly defined as any individual 
or group who is a member of the society whose interests an INGO project or program is 
intended to promote. The terms accountability, beneficiaries, INGO, and accountability 
to beneficiaries remain terms that are employed in various fashions across the sector of 
humanitarian aid and foreign assistance. After the 2010 Haiti earthquake, an evaluator 
studying the coordinated efforts of INGOs responding to the disaster remarked that there 
continues to be a range of definitions of accountability and a lack of a commonly shared 
vision of what an accountable humanitarian system would look like
10
. 
The traditional accountability relationship, based on funding commitments, is that 
INGOs are accountable to donors. Most studies of INGO accountability have focused on 
the upward accountability mechanism, or the accountability relationship between the 
INGO and their donor, which is the most straightforward application of the term 
accountability. However, as their influence has increased, they are also being seen as 
                                                          
9 Castiglione, Dario, “Accountability,” Encyclopedia of Governance (2006) SAGE Publications, 28 April, 
2011, http://www.sage-ereference.com/governance/Article_n1.html.  
10 Humanitarian Accountability Partnership, “The 2010 Humanitarian Accountability Report,” Geneva, 
Switzerland, 55.  
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accountable to beneficiaries. More importantly, the reason why INGOs exist is to help 
tackle these challenging global problems that aren’t being effectively dealt with by 
governments and the private sector alone. INGOs fill theses gaps and focus on the most 
vulnerable populations. In order to effectively meet these goals, INGOs must hold 
themselves accountable to the populations they intend to serve, even if donors are not 
requiring these mechanisms. This thesis will expose the differences between the 
Traditional Accountability to Beneficiaries (TAB) approaches currently employed by 
INGOs and a Strategic Accountability to Beneficiaries (SAB) approach proposed here. 
The SAB system acknowledges the problems identified above and works to target more 
specifically the real needs of the communities, achieve impact, and measure the results.  
Accountability to beneficiaries has grown in importance as INGOs have increased 
exponentially in numbers, have become increasingly important actors in the international 
community, and have faced public accusations about ineffective projects in recent years. 
The number of INGOs rose from 179 in 1909 to 28,900 in 1993 and the number of NGOs 
(local and international) is estimated to have doubled between 1978 and 1998
11
. The 
power of INGOs, some scholars argue, is in their power to persuade; their ability to 
divert some of the power once held solely by governments, persuading other 
governments and citizens of other state’s how to act12. Critics of government foreign aid 
spending and INGO activities have also caused this issue to rise in importance today. 
                                                          
11
 Commission on Global Governance 1995 as cited in Edwards, Michael and David Hulme, eds., Beyond 
the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World, (Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 1996), 1. 
 Union of International Associations, ed., 2002 as cited in Ahmed, Shamina and David Potter, NGOs in 
International Politics, (West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 2006). 
12
 Ahmed, Shamina and David Potter, NGOs in International Politics (West Hartford, Connecticut: 
Kumarian Press, 2006), 15. 
Wardwell, Sarah  
                A Strategic Model for INGO Accountability Systems                                                                          8| P a g e  
  
Increasingly, institutional donors, especially European donors, are expecting or even 
requiring INGOs to have accountability practices in order to consider funding their 
projects. International accountability agencies and partnerships have emerged in recent 
years to formalize the process within the international community. Charity rating 
agencies are beginning to look at these types of partnerships or memberships and include 
ratings for INGO’s accountability, which affects the amount of private and foundation 
funding.  
In mid-2000, Fareed Zakaria, managing editor of Foreign Affairs, remarked that, 
“my concern is that governments will listen too much to the loud [NGO] minority and 
neglect the fears of the silent majority,” and this would lead to “interested, unelected, 
unrepresentative and unaccountable NGOs”13. Zakaria’s comments echoed the sounds of 
many other critics concerned that since INGOs were unelected, they were thereby 
unaccountable. If INGOs were going to play a pivotal role in international politics, 
Zakaria and other likeminded scholars and pundits outlined the need for INGOs to 
become more democratic and accountable.  
This growing concern about accountability has not gone unnoticed within the 
INGO community. INGOs have focused more on accountability. Peer organizations 
competing for resources from donors force INGOs to formalize their monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms and other TAB tools for accountability. As INGOs grow from 
supporting operations in one country to many countries, they are also pushed to formalize 
their processes, solidify their theories of change, and develop other learning mechanisms 
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to continue their progress and impact. The maturity of this sector has led to the 
establishment of internal norms of accountability within INGOs, especially the larger 
INGOs who are in direct competition for financial resources. Unfortunately there has 
been more of a focus on TAB mechanisms and tools, though by focusing on developing 
their theories of change and furthering their organizational focus on learning is a SAB 
approach.  
Chapter two will trace the rise of the accountability debate. It will frame the key 
terms and discussions behind the INGO accountability to beneficiaries debate including 
accountability (in general), INGOs and their role in global governance, accountability 
relationships for INGOs, and stakeholders and beneficiaries. This chapter will also 
outline the view that accountability to beneficiaries needs to be strategically designed so 
as to maximize program impact.  
Chapter three will outline a model of accountability to beneficiaries. Beginning 
with an examination of who is to be held accountable and then carrying out a literature 
review of various types of accountability. For the purpose of this thesis, accountability 
to beneficiaries will be defined as the process through which an INGO justifies and is  
responsible for the manner and results of its projects and programs to any individual or 
group who is a member of the society whose interests they are  intended to promote. 
This chapter will look at the three questions that help to frame the discussion 
about how INGOs can be accountable to their beneficiaries: Accountable to whom? 
Accountable for what? Accountable how? Through these questions, the TAB and SAB 
approach will be compared. To connect the theoretical literature with real life examples, 
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the current situation in post-earthquake Haiti based on the author’s field experience will 
be a theme throughout this thesis. The first question most scholars address in studies of 
accountability is who is to be held accountable? In this thesis, INGOs will be the parties 
examined at the level of the organization, from those implementing programs to the 
leaders. One presumption of this thesis argument is that all members of the organization 
should be held accountable to the agency beneficiaries. The question of “Accountable to 
whom” breaks open a discussion about who are the people and entities affected by an 
INGO project. The expanded definition used in a SAB approach goes beyond the direct, 
intended beneficiaries and considers all groups affected, present and future. This also 
begins the discussion of direct and indirect impacts of INGO activities and winners and 
losers in aid projects. While one of the goals of foreign aid intervention is to improve 
social and economic development, which is the focus of this thesis, this is not a linear 
path nor is it a standardized process across all states. Social and economic development 
occurs differently within each unique country context, and this process requires give and 
take, or winners and losers. This process also occurs over time, an important parameter 
that will be considered within this discussion. 
The question of what INGOs are accountable for opens the debate about what 
particular actions affect the populations described in accountable to whom and then leads 
into the question of how transparency, participation, feedback and learning cycles, and 
complaint mechanisms can be used. A framework for measuring accountability to 
beneficiaries will be created in the “accountable how?” section. Finally, a section will be 
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included in chapter three that discusses how agencies measure their own accountability to 
beneficiaries, teasing out best practices as defined by the current literature on the topic.  
Chapter four looks at internal (i.e. within-organization) methods an INGO can use 
to measure its own accountability to beneficiaries. Scholarly literature on strategic 
management systems for non-profits and how they can apply to international agencies 
will be examined, followed by a example of an example of an internal accountability 
assessment of Mercy Corps, an American INGO that works in humanitarian relief and 
community-led development. In February 2011 Mercy Corps surveyed all program staff 
in its 35 country programs specifically asking about accountability to beneficiaries 
practices, tools, barriers, and how staff felt the agency was doing in regards to 
accountability to beneficiaries. The author led a working group to conduct this research 
project and was responsible for all of the primary data analysis and report writing. Other 
members of the agency were involved in advising on the project, whose opinions are 
included in this section. First, an overview of this organization and the background to this 
research project will be provided.  This discussion will outline the methodology used for 
completing this data analysis. Third, this example will be used to identify how Mercy 
Corps is currently framing and assessing the questions of accountable to whom and 
accountable for what. This chapter will conclude with a discussion about where Mercy 
Corps currently resides in its process of improving accountability to beneficiaries and 
recommended action steps. .  
Finally, a summary of conclusions reached from this thesis will compose the fifth 
chapter. This chapter will establish a recommended protocol for INGOs to improve their 
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internal measurement of their accountability to beneficiaries. The conclusion will include 
recommendations for future research and acknowledge some of the limitations to this 
research project.  
Survey questions from the Mercy Corps example are included in Annex A. There 
is also an annex of a brief overview of the World Bank and its attempts to improve 
accountability to beneficiaries. The World Bank is generally regarded as a donor, but 
they also carry out projects themselves, directly interacting with beneficiaries. This case 
study looks at the World Bank from the perspective of an organization to be held 
accountable by those they are directly serving. Additional annexes include a list of 
questions from the original Mercy Corps survey.  
The question this thesis asks is how to formulate and implement effective 
accountability to beneficiary systems at a time when both the responsibilities as well as 
the demands on INGOs are increasing at a rapid rate. The findings here contribute in two 
ways to the understanding of INGO accountability to beneficiaries (AB). First, the 
concept of AB is expanded beyond traditional narrow understandings to encompass 
longer-term and multi-stakeholder perspectives. Secondly, the utility of internal 
assessment tools to advance AB is highlighted, providing a concrete example of what a 
strategic approach to AB looks like in practice.  
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Chapter 2. The Rise of the Accountability Debate 
Part 1. The Debate on INGOs 
INGOs steadily expanded all over the world since the 1930s despite world wars, 
economic downturns, and the rise of antidemocratic states all over the world
14
. As 
INGOs have expanded in number, they have also increased their power. In 2004 after the 
Indonesian tsunami President Clinton advised INGOs, “with this heightened power and 
influence comes greater responsibility - NGOs must constantly examine not only what 
they are doing, but how they are doing it,”15. This section will highlight the most 
important moments and elements in the rise of the current debate around this topic and 
will conclude by looking at the different types of stakeholders and their role in holding 
INGOs accountable to the beneficiaries they serve. 
Key moments in global politics help to explain the space created for INGOs in 
international affairs. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 brought about the system of the 
nation-state, ending the system of kingdoms. The transfer in power from a kingdom ruled 
by a single family, to a nation-state with decentralized power, made space for entities 
outside of the government to have more influence and power. The development of the 
Red Cross in 1881 during the American Civil War, labor unions, women’s organizations, 
and other civil society groupings were the precursors to NGOs. The expansion of the Red 
Cross and the Salvation Army into international outreach during the Second World War 
were early 20
th
 century precursors to contemporary INGO work.  
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The development of nation-states created a new international order including 
introducing borders that have created a new series of problems for leaders. The birth of 
the League of Nations in 1934 began the inclusion of international organizations in 
global governance. The 1980s and 1990s dominance of the neoliberal economic agenda 
associated with the Washington Consensus, further eroded the demand for the state, and 
made more space for other institutions to play a role in state actions, from corporations to 
INGOs. During this time, INGOs were both proponents of this structural changes and 
vociferous opponents to the dominance of these frameworks
16
.  
Globalization has played a large role in the expanded abilities of INGOs to carry 
out their work around the world. Throughout the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, the increased 
speed of communication and ease of access to information has created gateways for 
people to see the lives of others and has increased sympathy for human suffering from 
afar. The increased ease of ability to travel has further brought people together like never 
before in history. Globalization has benefited some and many others have seen their 
conditions sink deeper into chronic poverty. All of these factors are a part of 
globalization and have created the space and need for INGOs.  
Along with the redefining of global politics comes an increase in demands for 
governance of those organizations. The increased growth in the number and size of 
INGOs, increased attraction of funds to INGOs, and their increased role in shaping public 
policy and unprecedented power have caused the question of INGO accountability to 
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rise
17
. “[I]NGO accountability became a central issue in large part after all because it was 
linked to the question of whether and to what extent [I]NGOs should be seen as 
‘representative’ of the world’s peoples – as one half, in other words, of an equation about 
global governance.” 18.  
Besides simply growing in numbers, INGOs have grown in importance to 
formally and informally shaping the global agenda. On the whole, INGOs and other civil 
society organizations have been treated with a secondary priority and their inputs have 
not been fully integrated into the policy process
19. During the late 1990’s World Bank 
Group President James Wolfensohn increasingly consulted with INGOs and began 
aligning World Bank policies with the wishes of INGOs, further increasing the 
legitimacy and role of INGOs in global governance
20
. The World Bank has created 
several joint committees with INGO and civil society actors to hear their points of view 
in shaping decisions
21
. The Ottawa Treaty signed in 1997 banning landmines was 
primarily led by NGOs (local and international) and consequently dramatically increased 
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their legitimacy, more formally integrating them into the international community
22
. As 
the role of INGOs in international politics matures, there will be increasing calls for 
accountability in order to increase their legitimacy
23
.  
In recent decades INGOs have even become the preferred vehicles for delivery of 
many economic and political objectives
24
. Many of these activities may not initially 
appear political such providing food security or health care services. “There is almost 
always a political element to fighting poverty – it is rarely only about giving people 
things or knowledge
25
.  Through the end of the twentieth century INGOs were generally 
regarded as good, but increasingly this image has dissipated and critics have begun to 
increase, arguing that NGOs undermine national sovereignty and lack a strong 
relationship with the public
26
.  
By providing these services INGOs are duplicating and in some cases replacing 
the role of the government. Bypassing state governments undermines state authority and 
also makes INGOs accountable to actors outside of the host national government
27
. 
INGOs then are acting diplomatically on behalf of their government and intervening in 
another government’s space. Both of these actions require slicing off part of the power of 
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each government in order to acquire legitimacy and the power to act in these ways. The 
effects of INGO interactions may cause further political challenges or opportunities. If 
populations live longer and healthier lives, increase the average citizen’s wealth, etc., 
governments will have to adapt their policies to meet the new needs of the populations.  
Mass media has also taken to the work of INGOs, dramatizing and sharing 
information on both their successes and blunders and more importantly raising the 
visibility of these organizations with a larger audience. With the increase in publicity and 
legitimacy, came the increase of criticism of INGO actions. INGOs were increasingly 
called upon to deal with complex humanitarian emergencies, from the refugee and 
humanitarian situation in Kosovo, to the Rwandan genocide, to the Indonesian tsunami 
and the Haitian earthquake. INGOs increasingly became the most likely choice for 
responding to these emergencies. After each disaster, complaints were issued against 
INGOs from the populations they had sought to support. These complaints became more 
vocal and numerous throughout the 1990s. There is not one single moment in the history 
of INGOs that marks the beginning of the debate about INGO accountability, rather this 
debate has flared up with each of these humanitarian crises. Since the debate is most 
vociferous after these crises, the discussion often focuses solely on the way INGOs 
respond to emergencies. However, the discussion of INGO accountability to beneficiaries 
is much broader and applies to all functions of these agencies, most notably their 
response to emergencies and their role in social and economic development. Three 
highly-public cases mark when the issue of INGO accountability was brought to 
international attention – the case raised by Zakaria noted in Chapter 1, a confrontation 
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between a World Bank dam construction project and a small Berkley-based INGO, and 
the recent case of Greg Mortenson’s INGO and his popular book “Three Cups of Tea”.  
In 2003 journalist Sebastian Mallaby questioned the role of INGOs in a World 
Bank funded dam building project in Bujagali Falls, Uganda. He found that a small 
number of individuals in this Ugandan community were unhappy to be displaced from 
their homes in order to allow for the building of this dam. This small group of people, 
working with an INGO was able to bar millions of potential beneficiaries who would 
have received electricity from this dam
28
. Mallaby uses this example to highlight the 
same point being made here, that all INGOs and their projects are simply not equal. The 
range of INGO intentions and projected outputs and outcomes varies so widely that the 
general public, governments, and other institutional donors have become wary of anti-
poverty or development ideas. This harms INGOs not only in their ability to secure funds 
for their ideas, but sometimes other INGOs, such as the one from Berkley cited above, 
can even sometimes stop another anti-poverty group’s project from happening. In other 
words, sometimes INGOs are their own worst enemy. 
This account became an important point in raising awareness of INGO 
accountability to beneficiaries, a discussion that had been gradually building since the 
1990’s with the increased role of INGOs in international politics and global governance 
and the increase in NGO criticism. Following this incident, the World Bank became 
increasingly wary of NGOs who may try to block their projects. The World Bank 
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continued to propose similar projects in Uganda, and with each proposal came press 
releases saying the project was moving forward barring any NGO blocks
29
. This anecdote 
highlights three important factors in the debate about accountability to beneficiaries that 
are critical to understand in order to discuss this topic : the rise of NGOs, particularly 
INGOs and their role in international politics as previously discussed; the actions of these 
organizations, especially their interactions with the communities and states where they 
work; and the need to involve all stakeholders in the project process to ensure their 
feedback, positive or negative, is incorporated.  Many scholars believe that accountability 
is a major source of vulnerability for the INGO sector
30
. One of the main supporting 
principles of this thesis is that accountability to beneficiaries is one way that an INGO 
can prove with some authority that they are doing no harm, helping donors and 
governments to choose wisely when selecting an organization to work with on a potential 
project.  
A third case of media criticism of INGOs came about in 2011 regarding Greg 
Mortenson, CEO of the Central Asia Institute and author of the New York Times 
bestselling book, “Three Cups of Tea”. Jon Krakauer, former supporter of the Central 
Asia Institute, accused Mortenson of falsifying information about his work for dramatic 
effect in his nonfiction book. These claims reach beyond literary critics and dig into the 
issues about INGO accountability to beneficiaries. Additional claims by Krakauer 
include a misuse of INGO funds by Mortenson, including private jets, and an exorbitant 
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salary for Mortenson; highlighting the discussion about stakeholders
31
. As noted in 
chapter one, INGOs are caught in between donors and beneficiaries. But there are 
additional groups that have an interest in the activities of INGOs beyond these simple 
two categories. This case illustrates the public interest from the home country of the 
organization, an important stakeholder for INGOs. Krakauer was concerned as a former 
private donor to the organization, but critics echoed his concerns in the media who had 
not given funds. This media pressure will also cause institutional donors to take a deeper 
look into the organization’s affairs and could damage funding opportunities for the 
future. If local media in Pakistan and Afghanistan where Mortenson’s projects were to 
hear these allegations, they could also make demands to look into the organization’s 
inner workings or even pose security threats to Mortenson or his staff. All of these groups 
are affected by the actions of the INGO, making them all stakeholders in the INGO 
accountability discussion. 
Part 2. Getting Concepts and Definitions Straight 
 
One of the main challenges in studying INGO accountability to beneficiaries lies 
in the difficulty of defining the key terms involved. Scholars, practitioners, and policy 
makers toss around these terms, frequently employing different meanings of the terms 
that will be defined in this chapter: accountability (in general), INGOs, stakeholders, 
beneficiaries, and accountability to beneficiaries. This section will provide definitions for 
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each of these terms and a justification for the wording of these definitions, beginning 
with the least controversial and working through to the most controversial terms. These 
definitions will set the foundation for the core arguments of this thesis. These are not 
intended to be definitive definitions for these terms, but rather concepts that are 
“intellectually and politically relevant to the context at hand”32.  
 
International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)  
Civil society is the space in-between governments and private citizens that can act 
locally or globally through voluntary associations to shape the rules that govern social 
life, or “the arena outside of the state and above the individual,”33. One of these types of 
organizations is international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which are a 
subset of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). INGOs essentially combine public 
service with private action, filling in social services that governments would like to 
provide but lack the resources to do so
34
. The term NGO was first used in the UN Charter 
in 1946
35
. This marks a point in the history of NGOs when they were becoming more 
commonly accepted. Having already been strongly rooted in society and the term must 
have been commonly in use.  
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For the purpose of this thesis, an INGO is defined as a not-for-profit organization 
separate from the government that seeks to advance a certain conception of the public 
interest through transnational activities. These organizations are voluntary in nature, 
operate in a global space and seek to advance core goals that are potentially 
transformative through normative commitments (mission statements, values, vision 
statements, theories of change, etc.) to improve the public good
36
. They may carry out a 
multitude of different types of activities, from bigger (multi-million dollar grants, multi-
year implementation periods, national or even regional) to smaller (targeting one specific 
community or a minority population, budgets of less than $100,000 USD, etc.) in all of 
the same sectors that a government or developed state’s private sector normally operates. 
For example, an INGO may offer health care programs in a state where the government 
cannot provide adequate health services. These programs could range from building 
hospitals to training health care professionals to developing innovative ways to improve 
maternal and child health in a particularly challenging environment, such as a war zone. 
The term INGO can be difficult to understand because its very name explains 
mostly what it is not (non-governmental) rather than what it is. The term carries many 
different meanings from different vantage points. For some, it is synonymous with the 
“aid industry”, as effective tools or channels for donors to provide international 
development funds to developing states. For others, they are seen as “vehicles for 
privatizing foreign assistance, making it less accountable to either government authorities 
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or local people because of a lack of clear governance structures for NGOs,”37. Still to 
others INGOs are grassroots organizations synonymous with community action, or 
service contractors working more efficiently than the government with limited 
legitimacy, and more recently they are seen as international policy actors, especially in 
the areas of human rights and environmental protection
38
. In recent years, INGOs have 
also come to be seen to provide more innovative solutions to past endemic problems, 
such as chronic poverty, than traditional bureaucratic political systems can offer.  
These organizations voluntarily opt to use the term INGO. There are many types 
of organizations that fall outside the scope of this thesis in an effort to streamline the 
definition of the term, including religious organizations such as missionaries, educational 
organizations including universities, and professional or trade organizations.  
INGOs play many different roles: humanitarian relief, social and economic 
development, advocacy and lobbying, public education and consciousness raising, 
agenda setting, and monitoring other transnational actors. Some scholars group these 
activities into “naming, framing, blaming, and shaming”39. The dominant INGOs are 
involved in most, if not all of these activities. This is because INGOs cannot function 
with stand-alone projects, in order to accomplish their bigger idealistic missions and 
achieve outcomes such as environmental protection or poverty alleviation; they must act 
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on all possible levels, connecting with all actors involved
40
. Much of the debate on 
accountability to beneficiaries has focused on humanitarian relief work, but for this 
thesis, the role of INGOs in action, either through humanitarian relief or social and 
economic development will be focused upon since INGOs are directly interacting with 
beneficiaries the most in these roles.  
 INGOs carry out both projects and programs, while these terms are very similar it 
is worth a brief explanation of the difference. These terms differ mainly in the size of the 
activities carried out. A project means that fewer activities are carried out generally over 
a shorter period of time than a program, which includes a larger quantity of activities that 
tend to be more varied in scope and occur over a longer period of time. This thesis is 
interested in both and terminology choice will be based upon these definitions.  
 INGOs operate in a context of rapid change. The international political and 
economic environment is continually changing as well as attitudes towards the work 
carried out by INGOs. These organizations are forced to continually adapt and innovate 
to meet the changing world around them. They are at once being shaped by globalization, 
profiting from the space created by the new globalized political order, and contributing to 
the shifting shape of the new international arena. In order to justify the increased 
attention they have drawn and avoid the backlash of bad press than they receive, INGOs 
must improve their structures and procedures for being accountable to those they intend 
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to serve
41
. As many INGOs focus on change, so must these organizations strive for 
change in their accountability systems and practices.  
Accountability in General 
The term accountability originates from the Latin word meaning “to count” and 
was first known to be used in 1794
42
.  The term sprung from the literal sense that “a 
count” was necessary for monies left in one’s care43. Later, the term took on a meaning as 
an abstract noun referring to both “the capacity of, and the obligation on, someone to 
produce an account”44. Public authorities were called to “respond” to their public about 
their conduct and actions, but were not held “accountable” until the 1980s. The word 
accountability doesn’t exist in other languages; “responsibilité” is used in French, 
“responsabilidad” in Spanish, and “verantwortlichkeit” in German. Each of these terms 
has a closer relationship to the word “responsibility” in English.  
In this thesis, accountability is defined as the ongoing process of justifying and 
being responsible for the manner and results of one’s actions to relevant stakeholders. 
This definition intentionally includes the word “responsibility” to help clarify the 
relationship between the two words and acknowledge the intertwining relationship 
between them as is commonly used among most scholars
45
. Actions can be responsible, 
such as following a prescribed process and achieving an output, without being 
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accountable, providing the desired outcome. Accountability is critical thinking, reflecting 
whether those processes and outputs that are considered responsible are actually having 
the intended effect. An example helps clarify this; if a program manager decides to 
purchase and distribute 200 Aquatabs to a cholera-affected community he can be 
responsible and follow the organization’s process for this purchase and distribution. 
However, to be accountable to the community requires going a step further and ensuring 
that these Aquatabs are distributed to those who need them most, that the recipients 
understand how to use them, and that the recipients have a plan to get clean water after 
the distributions end. In Chapter Three there will be more examples from the Haitian 
context that further explain and clarify the idea of accountability in practice. 
Accountability focuses on the process and the outcome, whereas responsibility more 
narrowly focuses on the process and the output. 
In academia, there is tension between whether accountability is perceived as a 
process or an outcome; similar to how democracy is both a process and an outcome. 
Accountability is a series of ongoing negotiations among stakeholders rather than a strict 
definition or interpretation
46
. That is to say accountability is not an output, there is no 
magic equation of factors that can be put together to arrive at accountability. In this sense 
accountability is not purely procedural nor is it confined only to an end goal.  
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It is also both an obligation and a willingness to act depending on the situation
47
. 
In some cases accountability mechanisms may bind an organization or individual to be 
held to give an account of their actions. In others, an organization or individual may see 
benefits from willingly providing an account. Accountability implies the “ ‘rights of 
authority’ in that those calling for an account are asserting rights of superior authority 
over those who are accountable, including the rights to demand answers and to impose 
sanctions,”48.  
Changes in political systems and management expectations have integrated the 
term accountability into American parlance. “Democracy is a continual correction of 
mistakes,” and in this way democratic leaders are held accountable to their public by 
offering apologies, explanations, compensations and possible resignations for their 
actions
49
. Since the public are directly involved in selecting and in some cases ousting 
leaders, the notion of accountability easily fits the democratic context; hence elections are 
often seen as a key method in democratic accountability. 
Expanding the notion of accountability to global governance is a more difficult 
task. There is a nominal relationship between voters in democratic societies and then the 
actions of those representative bodies in global governance organizations, but this link is 
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weak in practice
50
. For example, citizens themselves are unable in most cases to take 
global organizations to court. The lack of accountability in this intermediary space 
between citizens, governments, and global governance has created space for civil society 
to represent the demands of citizens, especially minorities and vulnerable populations to 
be heard on the global stage. “To ask about accountability is not merely to ask whether 
[I]NGOs ‘responsibly’ exercise their power, but instead whether a basis exists for them to 
be invested with such power in the first place,”51.  
Like many modern terms employed in politics such as sustainability or 
globalization, accountability seems to be leading down the path of becoming an 
essentially contested concept, a term that has become a placeholder for the greater debate 
it encompasses.  If accountability does become an essentially contested concept, it would 
lose its meaning, and the lively debate around it right now would diminish. One way of 
avoiding this situation is to tack on additional words to the original term, adding depth. 
For example, “political globalization” or “cultural globalization” provides more 
information than the term “globalization” by itself. Likewise, the term “accountability to 
beneficiaries” provides more insight into the intended meaning.  
Another way of further defining accountability is into functional/procedural 
accountability and strategic/substantive accountability. Practical accountability refers to 
the bureaucratic and internal functions of an organization, “accounting for resources, 
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resource use, and immediate impacts”52. It answers the questions: Are they acting in a 
prudent, careful manner? Are they transparent with their spending? Are they keeping 
accurate records of their activities and spending? Strategic accountability looks deeper 
into the outcomes and impacts of the organization, accounting for the impact from the 
organization and it’s actions on the wider environment53. It asks are they spending their 
funds appropriately? This thesis is primarily interested in strategic accountability, while 
recognizing the contributions of practical accountability to that end. 
Stakeholders and Beneficiaries 
Accountability can be a nebulous and unmanageable term unless the stakeholders 
to whom the individual or organization is to be held accountable to are identified. Each 
stakeholder brings their own set of expectations, making it difficult for individuals 
operating within an organization to decide how to best manage all of these in a way that 
maximizes impact. For the purpose of this thesis, a stakeholder is defined as 
any individual or group who has a legal obligation, moral, or material interest in the 
actions of the NGO. Generally, the list includes the donor (private, public, or corporate), 
government from the donor country, host national government, host local government, 
affected community (which can be further disaggregated by interests such as gender, age, 
disabled, poor, entrepreneurs, etc.), INGO board and other leadership, partner agencies 
(such as Southern NGOs), peer agencies, and the program staff. These forces are depicted 
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below in the diagram
54
. All of these groups are diverse and can be further broken down 
by special interests depending on the actual program, which is why a specific stakeholder 
analysis for each program is a necessary first step in developing an accountability to 
beneficiaries framework
55. “Since the relative importance of the relationships is context 
and case-specific, the INGO must review all the relevant legal, moral, ethical, and 
political claims made on them and make a strategic decision about which claim carries 
the most weight.”56. All stakeholders play a monitoring role in the activities of the NGO 
depending on their interest in the activities. 
 
Figure 2. INGO Stakeholders 
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Not all stakeholders will see positive benefits from the actions of an INGO. With 
most INGO interventions, there will be tradeoffs, or moresimply put, winners and losers. 
With most foreign interventions, a fundamental question related to accountability is: who 
enjoys the benefits and may suffer consequences
57
? 
Beneficiaries are a specific subset of stakeholders as they are the persons most 
likely to be directly affected by an NGO program activities, or outputs. In social and 
economic development, these individuals tend to be significantly economically and/or 
socially disadvantaged, and living in a developing state. For this thesis, they are the 
primary stakeholder, whose perspective is being studied. A beneficiary is defined in this 
thesis as any individual or group who is a member of the society whose interests the 
project or program is intended to promote.  
Beneficiaries who are living in poverty have unique limitations that present 
particular problems to holding organizations accountable. These groups tend to be 
unaccustomed to having a voice in local governance. In many developing countries 
police and other systems intended to protect people require fees that may block 
individuals from accessing these services when they have complaints or concerns. Many 
vulnerable groups are even afraid of voicing their concerns since it could only worsen 
their situation.  
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These definitions will set the stage for developing an accountability to 
beneficiaries definition in chapter three and will build the bedrock of the arguments this 
thesis puts forward. As this chapter has shown, a great part of the challenge in measuring 
accountability lies in first arriving at a common meaning for each term, a challenge that 
the larger international community has yet to, and may never, overcome.  
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Chapter 3. Defining Accountability to Beneficiaries  
As chapter two has identified, holding INGOs accountable to their beneficiaries is 
a principle that should be implemented in a way so as to ensure that projects are effective 
and impactful in a positive way. Although sometimes written off as too idealistic, 
principle-based, or academic, this thesis contends that with concrete practices and 
systems to measure accountability to beneficiaries, beneficiaries themselves can become 
an important component of measuring the impact, and ultimately success, of a project or 
organization. This chapter sets apart the concept of strategic accountability to 
beneficiaries (SAB) from traditional approaches to this concept, or traditional 
accountability to beneficiaries (TAB). TAB practices include the mechanisms and tools 
that INGOs currently employ without seeing overall improvements in their impact. 
Standard tools used by INGOs to measure their results and progress, such as the logframe 
that organizes the activity with indicators of achieving the goals or intended outcomes of 
the project, may not lead to accountability in the SAB sense because they can lead staff to 
focus too heavily on studying only the indicators they have decided to study and could 
miss other impacts their project is causing, either positive or negative. This type of TAB 
tool shall be discussed later on in this chapter.  
SAB practices make up a framework that allows leaders to incorporate 
mechanisms and tools into their projects and operations throughout their organization, 
improving not only outputs but also outcomes of their work. The information gained 
through SAB mechanisms and tools help leaders make strategic decisions to align their 
organizational mission and values better with the projects and activities they carry out. 
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SAB also differs from TAB in that it holds all members of the organization to account for 
their behavior and actions, rather than just select project or program leaders.  
Haiti is an example of the struggle for INGOs to be accountable to the 
beneficiaries they intend to serve. In a 2011 Rolling Stone article quoting President 
Clinton’s experience in the impoverished nation, “For too long the West has embraced 
‘development for development’s sake,’ throwing money at poor countries without 
demanding either accountability or results.”58. Using the case of Haiti, this chapter will 
walk through the theoretical arguments from the debate about accountability to 
beneficiaries, further differentiating between TAB and SAB approaches, mechanisms, 
and tools. The definitions developed in chapter two will be used in this chapter to open 
the foundational questions in the debate, beginning with assessing who is to be held 
accountable. Next, this chapter will discuss the different directions of accountability 
before focusing on accountability to beneficiaries and delineating what is meant by the 
term. The heart of the theoretical aspect of this debate will then be explored by 
responding to these three core questions: Accountable to whom? Accountable for what? 
Accountable how? A related annex attached to this thesis includes a brief examination of 
how the World Bank has taken steps towards increasing accountability to beneficiaries 
when they act as a project implementer.   
Who is Accountable 
 Chapter two highlighted the many different stakeholders involved in any INGO 
intervention, from intended beneficiaries to local government to multi-national donors. 
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The first step in moving towards an accountability framework is to determine which of 
these stakeholders are to be held accountable.  
For the bulk of academic research, large institutional donors and western 
governments are held accountable for the success and failures of international 
development activities over the past half century. “Accountability is too often skewed to 
the most powerful of stakeholders, that is, those who provide financial resources.”59. 
Many of these arguments rely on colonialist and neo-colonialist theories. There is some 
merit in these arguments as these institutions are holding the purse strings to most large-
scale development activities. However, these arguments are weak from the perspective 
that these institutions rarely implement activities  
USAID, the United States Agency for International Development, sets up offices 
all over the world to hold their experts and administrative staff. However the main 
function of these field offices are to ensure program quality and vet implementing 
partners and not to actually carry out programs themselves. Ensuring program quality and 
ensuring effective disbursement of funds all too often amounts to little more than 
reviewing annual reports
60
. In a 2010 interview with a USAID Chief of Mission in 
Vietnam, he candidly confessed making fewer visits to the field than he would have 
liked. When pressed to come up with a frequency, he lamented that he usually tries to get 
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out of the office to visit a project quarterly, but also admitted that the logistics involved in 
arranging such a visit often slow down the actual number of visits he can take in a year 
61
. 
This example is from Vietnam during a period of peace and stability where logistics are 
much simpler than in a country such as Haiti, which remains volatile and has much worse 
infrastructure to facilitate such visits. While INGOs need to place an increased 
importance on the perceptions and input from their beneficiaries, in order for INGOs to 
effect an accountability system to their beneficiaries, they will need the input and 
relationship with their donors in which to do so. Achieving an INGO accountability to 
beneficiaries system will be closely linked to donors recognizing the importance of such 
a system
62
.  
The second most-cited party held accountable in the literature is the government 
of the country receiving aid. This argument has slightly more credibility since these 
governments will be left with the remains of whatever projects enter their country. In 
development best-practice the government is often referred to as a partner in development 
activities. However, in reality, often organizations find it easier to achieve their projected 
project outputs by simply informing the government of their activities or altogether 
bypassing them. This has been a particular problem in Haiti where many INGOs are 
spending private funding they raised after the earthquake. Since these funds are less 
restricted by their donors, the agencies are not obligated to involve the government in the 
project in the same way they would be if they were receiving institutional funding. 
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Therefore they can implement activities that they believe are benefitting the community 
irrespective of what the appointed government leaders believe is needed. This has led to 
numerous cross-over activities by organizations carrying out similar, duplicative or even 
counter-productive projects at the same time. In 2011 in Saint-Marc, Haiti, the mayor has 
attempted to tackle this problem by asking all NGOs (local and international) to meet 
once a month and discuss their projects. NGO leaders are asked to give overviews of their 
projects and the mayor and the other NGO leaders give input on projects
63
. 
Corruption is also cited frequently as a barrier to holding the aid-recipient 
government accountable for INGO activities. Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index, which is published annually, roughly aligns with where western 
governments are putting their aid dollars
64
. Countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia 
rate among the highest levels of corruption worldwide according to this metric, and they 
historically and continually receive some of the largest sums of humanitarian and 
development aid amounts the world over. Haiti is rated 1.8 on this scale of 0-10 where 
zero is very corrupt and ten is very clean, making it the 9
th
 most corrupt country as 
measured on this index (ranking 175/182 with 5 sources reporting and a confidence range 
of 1.6-2)
65
. In late 2011 the mayor of Saint-Marc came to the Mercy Corps office to 
inquire about project progress, then he informed the Head of Office that he was planning 
a housing development that would be “très chic” including a golf course. Perhaps, he 
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suggested, this would make more suitable housing for INGO management
66
. It can be 
difficult to say the government is the focal point for INGO accountability when they are 
facing their own series of challenges from mismanagement, fund misappropriation, to 
being out of touch with their communities. In Haiti the latter challenge is particularly 
clear with the elitist divide between the ruling class and “pèp la” or general population. In 
other non-democratic societies this disconnect between government and public is well 
documented in democratic theory literature.  
For this thesis, the INGO as a whole, herein referred to as “the organization”, will 
be the focal point of accountability. Since the INGO is the actor carrying out the majority 
of the activities themselves, it is the most appropriate actor to say “the buck stops here”. 
Further, choosing the INGO as the actor who is responsible for accountability to 
beneficiaries also puts the INGO in the driver’s seat of improving their results and 
impact. INGOs will have a more research-backed claim to impact by following a SAB 
approach. As this thesis contends, it is expected that when an INGO takes initiative to 
carefully consider and analyze their actions in response to how accountable to their 
beneficiaries these actions are, that the actions will on the whole lead to a more positive 
impact. A TAB approach to AB would focus only on one part of the agency, whereas the 
SAB approach considers every decision made within the agency by all actors.  
In a SAB approach, holding the organization accountable involves the actions of 
everyone in the agency. Just as democratic accountability requires all actors within the 
society to be accountable, INGO accountability to beneficiaries requires the actions of all 
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members of an INGO to be held accountable
67. Cavill and Sohail term this “collective 
accountability”, holding every member of the organization liable for the organization’s 
conduct
68
. The organization decisions made at the top of organization, such as which 
countries to work in, down to decisions about project implementation.   
Much academic literature treats INGOs as entities, but as these organizations are 
run by many individuals simultaneously making decisions all over the globe, in a SAB 
approach it’s necessary to think about how accountability to beneficiaries will impact and 
infiltrate every one of those decisions. Cavill and Sohail refer to this as “individual 
accountability”, where each member of the organization’s actions as they contribute to 
the organization’s conduct as a whole are measured69.  Figure three below shows a SAB 
approach to this question where each individual is responsible for a different aspect of the 
organization’s accountability, depending on their unique role. These roles are designed to 
fit any INGO structure. Starting with the bottom left corner, all INGOs have 
administrative staff, often referred to as operations staff, who are accountable for 
ensuring compliance with all formal procedures are complied with. This includes 
upwards accountability measures such as stipulated by the grant agreement, local and 
international laws, and internal policies and procedures. The bottom right corner is the 
producer/executive, who oversees the entire INGO mission or operation. These people 
usually have titles such as Country Director, Mission Director, Head of Office, or 
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Operations Manager/Director. These individuals ensure accountability, looking at the 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of the project implementation. This has a lot to do 
with budget controls and operations management, but also includes working with project 
teams to ensure they have found the optimal way to carry out their project activities.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Who's Accountable?
70
 
The top right hand corner is led by the innovator or strategists within the 
organization. These individuals tend to sit on the programs side of the organization 
creating new projects. They are not necessarily in a senior position, but most INGOs will 
have someone like this in a senior-level and then others at a mid-level working on 
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country-specific new projects. As innovators and strategists, they are accountable for the 
diagnosis and design of the organization’s interventions. The individuals in the top left 
corner are the integrators and negotiators who carry out the projects. These individuals 
are the ones left with the actual accountability for development outcomes as they are the 
ones directly implementing the project activities. When producer/executives are 
accountable for the 3 E’s (economy, efficiency, and effectiveness) and the administrators 
are accountable for compliance, the organization will have stability. When the 
integrator/negotiators are accountable for the development/project implementation and 
administrators are accountable for compliance, there will be procedural accountability 
achieved. When the producer/executives are accountable for the 3Es and the 
innovators/strategists are accountable for their diagnosis of the problem and project 
design, there should be measurable results, or outputs. To achieve change, all of these 
actors need to be held accountable for their individual aspects, but most importantly the 
innovators/strategists must have properly diagnosed the problem and be held accountable 
for their implementation design and the integrator/negotiators must be held accountable 
for the development and implementation of the project.  This figure helps to break apart 
individual roles and responsibilities and their specific accountability relationship within 
the larger concept of accountability to beneficiaries. 
Accountability Compass  
 
There are three main purposes of accountability as defined by the scholarly 
literature – to whom, for what, and how? These questions help identify the type or 
direction of accountability in question. As discussed in chapters one and two, 
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accountability can be a rather vague term unless it is qualified by adding the direction or 
affected population. As such, accountability can be imagined as a compass, spun to point 
in the direction of the “to whom” population in question.  
Accountability to whom identifies the group or individual who the accountable 
party wants their actions to be held accountable to. This seemingly straight-forward 
question has caused a great deal of debate amongst scholars and practitioners and 
highlights the gap between theory and practice. In theory many INGOs aspire to have 
their actions be held accountable to the populations they serve, but in reality, they are 
held more tightly to their donors by more rigorously developed monitoring and 
evaluation mechanisms and finances. Simply put by one field worker, “‘There is an 
ongoing battle between being accountable to the people you work with and for, versus the 
people who give you the money to do that work.’”71.  
Since INGOs occupy a middle position in the chain of foreign aid spending, 
INGO accountability can be broken down into upwards and downwards accountability. 
Upwards accountability describes the relationship between the INGO and donors, board 
of trustees, and the host government or the relationships that “face up the aid chain”72. 
Downwards accountability, rather, focuses on the relationship between the INGO and 
beneficiary, or the relationships that “face down the aid chain”73. These relationships also 
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exemplify the transitions of power from one actor to another. There are two additional 
directions accountability relationships flow: horizontal and strategic/inward. Horizontal 
accountability is where members of the organization hold one another accountable for 
their actions, also known as “professional accountability”74. Within a traditional 
hierarchical management structure, this is a similar system of upwards accountability 
internally. Using more innovative management structures such as a team map helps 
visualize and encourage team members holding each other accountable for their decisions 
and actions. Competition between individuals can present problems with this type of 
accountability and warrant at least one other form be used. Lastly, there is strategic or 
internal accountability, which similar to horizontal accountability holds INGOs 
accountable to their organizational mission and values and for working within established 
societal norms and expectations
75
.  
The second question, “accountable for what?” identifies the actions for which the 
accountable party wishes to be held accountable for. Accountability can be understood as 
the “management of expectations”76.  The party that will be held accountable has the 
opportunity to decide which of their actions they wish to be held accountable. This is not 
to say that their wishes will always be followed, a public can hold a democratically 
elected official accountable for their personal actions that are not overtly recognized in 
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their position description. As chapter two discussed, INGOs carry out a multitude of 
activities that affect different populations in differing direct and indirect manners. At this 
point accountability can be split into two directions:  practical and strategic. Practical 
accountability relates to the use of inputs, policies, and decision making to deliver 
outputs
77
. This type of accountability focuses heavily on the day-to-day operations and 
financial management of the INGO. Cynics of INGO accountability to beneficiaries 
downplay the importance of this type of accountability as supporting only the continued 
existence and reproduction of the organization. However, for an organization to 
implement a strong accountability system – both upwards and downwards, this function 
of accountability must be included. Strong operational and finance systems are essential 
to the smooth implementation of a program. When operations and finance staff are 
consistently thinking about accountability with each decision, and being involved and 
questioning the decisions made by the program teams, accountability takes on a more 
robust form.  
Strategic accountability, or more specifically SAB, which is the focus on this 
thesis, examines how the INGO performs in relation to their mission
78
. While some 
scholars see these as two distinct forms of accountability, they are closely linked and in 
practice often indistinguishable. As this thesis has discussed previously, the whole INGO 
is to be held accountable. This holistic approach to accountability asks each member of 
the organization to be dedicated to the mission and values of the organization. 
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Additionally, practical accountability plays in when considering the daily activities that 
lead towards strategic accountability. This is not necessarily a cause and effect 
relationship, but rather a process, whereby practical accountability coupled with a strong 
sense of the mission and values leads to a vibrant accountability structure.  
The third question, “accountable how?”  helps to clarify the specific mechanisms 
and steps an interested party can take to measure and improve their accountability. 
Mechanisms vary widely depending on the responses to the first two questions. This is 
also the most highly contested area around accountability. “Accountability to clients 
should be a major emphasis since most INGOs’ missions emphasize serving the 
community in various ways. However, most communities lack mechanisms for holding 
INGOs accountable, especially poor communities.”79. Scholars and practitioners have 
proposed mechanisms for the past few decades only for another to find that their 
mechanism can be in fact counterproductive to accountability. A general example of this 
is monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. As the INGO sector has matured, M&E 
has become a bedrock of INGO best practices. Modern scholars are questioning the 
effectiveness of M&E at holding INGO activities accountable to the populations they 
serve. Some even find it to be a barrier to accountability.  
“Measurement is, arguably, the most challenging aspect behind the principles of 
aid effectiveness,”80. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are mechanisms 
intended to measure INGO output and impact achievement. Donors rely heavily on 
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results of regular monitoring results and final evaluations of projects to assess the impact 
of their funds. In 2011 USAID began an increased effort to conduct more external final 
evaluations on projects they have invested large sums in since this type of evaluation 
eliminates a level of bias. M&E systems increase upward accountability because they 
increase the flow of information from the project to the donor. However, M&E systems 
are not necessarily a way to increase downward accountability. Given the complexity of 
beneficiary populations and the many activities for which INGOs are to be held 
accountable to these populations, measurement systems must take on a more holistic 
approach to understanding and measuring not only the outputs, but also the outcomes of a 
project in a SAB system. There is an additional danger of evaluations in that there is 
pressure from the donor and the organization to show that the work was well done and 
problem areas can be glossed over
81
.  
M&E systems are often based around logical frameworks (commonly referred to 
as a log frame), 4 x 4 matrices that specify the goal, purpose, outputs and inputs of a 
project, and objectively verifiable indicators that these outputs were met. Sometimes 
these indicators can be too narrowly focused so that “only that which is measurable 
should be measured and other phenomena are thus not considered important”82. Often 
key issues can be lost in M&E log frames. For example, Mercy Corps published a 
learning document discussing the positive and unexpected benefits to women in rural 
Tajikistan from a food assistance program. These effects were not measured in the log 
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frame, but their effects on the community were notable and worth sharing internally and 
externally. Additionally, sometimes donors require such a large quantity of information 
that it can become cumbersome on project managers. An example from a Aga Khan rural 
development project in India where they were asked to track 89 different indicators. 
Reams of data were generated from these indicators, but the project managers found that 
the data they were not asked to report on was actually the most useful to the project’s 
success
83
. Ebrahim argues against the idea that the more rigorous the performance 
measurement, the better it is and instead suggests “focusing on measures that make a 
difference rather than measures that are countable, and that this would make the work 
more accountable to the interests of intended beneficiaries, who, of course, have an 
interest in being benefited, not just being reported on,”84. Therefore M&E systems alone 
are not sufficient to measure accountability.  
Accountability mechanisms can be grouped into: internal (organization-wide) 
initiatives, external (independent) initiatives, and external peer or sector initiatives
85
. 
Internal mechanisms can be implemented by the organization themselves, including 
organization-wide surveys, frameworks, toolkits, accountability advisors, and M&E 
systems. These mechanisms are the main focus of this thesis as they are steps any 
member of an organization can take action on to improve the accountability of their 
actions and decisions.  
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External (independent) initiatives include the range of actions for actors in the 
external environment in which INGOs operate that hold them accountable for their 
actions and decisions. Some of these actors include the local civil society, media, host 
government, and individuals from the home or host country of the INGO. These 
individuals and groups can use a variety of mechanisms to hold the INGO accountable 
primarily by demanding information, voicing complaints, raising concerns via media 
outlets, protesting, and refusing to conduct business with the INGO (mostly through 
private sector actors). This type of initiative also includes legal regulations such as those 
set by the United Nations (UN), local laws, policy agreements, and a growing body of 
common law and court cases from international courts.  INGOs can be bound by quasi-
legal measures such as contracts and memorandums of understanding. These external 
initiatives and forces acting upon INGOs affect how INGOs select internal accountability 
to beneficiaries mechanisms, but are outside the scope of this thesis.  
The third group of mechanisms includes more controversial ideas about INGOs 
holding each other accountable for their actions. These include associations such as the 
Active Learning Network for Accountability and Practice (ALNAP) and the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership International (HAP-I). All of these 
organizations are optional for INGOs to join, but once they are members they are obliged 
to make significant progress on their accountability mechanisms as the association 
outlines. These are steps that senior leaders within INGOs can choose to take towards 
improving accountability, but are outside the scope of this thesis since this thesis looks 
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more at the actions that each member of the organization can take to improve 
accountability rather than just decisions senior leadership can make.  
 
Locating Accountability to Beneficiaries within INGO Activities 
A foundational argument in this thesis is that accountability to beneficiaries 
increases INGO impact. Within the organization as a whole there are many different 
activities that each individual carries out and for which she must be held accountable for. 
This section will look at this question from a slightly different angle, examining the 
different components of INGO work and how each contributes to accountability to 
beneficiaries.  
As stated in chapter two, this thesis defines beneficiaries as any individual or 
group who is a member of the society whose interests the project or program is intended 
to promote. The definition of accountability to beneficiaries is constructed by combining 
the definitions of accountability and beneficiaries. As stated in chapter one, 
accountability to beneficiaries will be defined as the process through which an INGO 
justifies and is responsible for the manner and results of its projects and programs to any 
individual or group who is a member of the society whose interests they are  intended to 
promote. Focusing on this type of accountability encourages the organization to stay 
aligned with their mission and values, and theoretically increase impact. It’s difficult to 
say that accountability to beneficiaries mechanisms will always result in increased impact 
due to the numerous and highly varied forces acting upon any single project and the 
actors involved. INGOs know all too well how difficult documenting and claiming results 
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of their projects can be. Causal relationships in this sector are nearly impossible to draw, 
at best INGO actions can be included as corollary to a perceived impact.  
The figure below breaks down the concept of strategic accountability to 
beneficiaries by each main component of what the organization is accountable for. This 
diagram looks at the actions and activities of the organization from a bigger picture point 
of view, beyond just the life cycle of a project, calling specific attention to the parts and 
details of each larger component.  
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Figure 4. Accountability to Beneficiaries Components 
First, there is the organization, which encompasses all individual actions and also 
includes those actions not directly associated with implementing a project. Accountability 
should be a part of the organization’s overall strategy. For example having a strategic 
framework in place that guides the organization and encourages accountability practices, 
is a good start towards achieving accountable project outcomes.  The organization, could 
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have an accountability framework and possibly a toolkit of accountability mechanisms, 
that the individual project chooses which specific tools fit the needs of the context at 
hand. The mission and values of the organization are closely linked to strategic 
accountability. If the organization hopes to achieve their mission and act in alignment 
with their values, they must implement accountability practices. Press and media 
coverage are usually handled, at least in part, by the organization’s headquarters, and thus 
are represented in this section. Individual projects may also use the media as 
accountability tools, but for the whole organization’s actions, this is placed here. Linked 
also the organization is public policy changes, where the policy section of an INGO may 
work with their home government or international governing actors, such as the UN to 
affect policy change.  
Secondly, there is the project, which is where most practitioners focus their time 
and energy on when considering accountability. This is a logical place to start, as this is 
the main point of action. The project will work towards achieving outputs during the 
entire cycle, from assessment to final evaluation. The time period where stakeholders will 
be affected is in both the short and long term, depending on the activity. The project is 
where individual project-specific accountability systems should be introduced. The 
project also has goals for bigger picture outcomes, such as poverty alleviation, food 
security, or environmental protection.  
The next step is beneficiaries, as a key part of the downward accountability 
system, this group includes the intended beneficiaries from the project. Beneficiaries also 
include the staff, or internal beneficiaries as part of internal accountability. Upwards 
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accountability includes the community, general public, or the greater nation in which the 
INGO is working who will be affected in some way by the actions of the project. 
Beneficiaries may also be horizontal, as in partner or local organizations that will be 
affected by the project. Sometimes these partners may look different from the traditional 
sub-grant concept. For instance, during an Local-Regional Procurement food security 
project (LRP), local vendors will supply the food that USAID gives beneficiaries the 
money to purchase. In this type of project, the vendors are the horizontal beneficiaries. 
Beneficiaries may be affected in a positive manner, and those who are possibly affected 
negatively. Lastly, there is the effect on future generations that must be considered when 
discussing beneficiaries of a project. The lifetime of an INGO intervention may be only a 
few months or a few years, but its effects may last for several generations. These effects 
may morph over time from a positive to negative sense.  
Next, is the impact step of accountability. The four main dimensions of impact are 
local and national politics, environmental effects, donor country impacts, and time 
considerations. Local and national politics can be either positively or negatively affected 
by the project and the beneficiaries’ view of the project. The environment will be altered 
in some way by any type of foreign intervention. USAID has recognized this and with 
certain projects, they now require an environmental assessment be conducted before and 
after each intervention. In a project in Tajikistan called the Tajikistan Stability 
Enhancement Project (TSEP), an individual was hired specifically to monitor these 
impacts from each activity within the multi-year project
86
. Each project will also have 
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effects back in the donor country, largely affecting foreign policy decisions. For example, 
USAID funded projects working in the area of HIV/AIDS prevention could have affects 
on US foreign policy to affected areas or on future foreign aid spending in this sector. 
INGO project impact may also affect foreign policy decisions through donor-country 
impacts. The impacts of a project or an INGOs interventions may vary over time, but 
time is again an important consideration.  
Lastly, is assessment, which may take place at the project level or the 
organization level of analysis. Since the organization is the focus of this thesis, 
organizational assessments are the level of study. This thesis will discuss three types of 
assessments: internal, external, and participatory, looking at how they each relate to 
accountability to beneficiaries systems. While assessments occur before, during, and after 
a project, it is listed here as a final stage because this is where information is recorded 
before it gets cycled back to the organization for use in either informing future project 
decisions or designing new projects. While many evaluations include participation from 
project beneficiaries (intended beneficiaries), a participative assessment in this sense 
includes all stakeholders, even those not directly benefiting from an INGO intervention.  
Accountable to whom? 
In the discussion of accountability to beneficiaries, this thesis has already 
established that the group of individuals that will be affected by an INGO project, the 
“beneficiaries”, is larger than those intentionally targeted by the project in a SAB 
approach. Defining the beneficiaries is more complicated than just considering the group 
of intended project beneficiaries because INGO projects have ripple effects beyond their 
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intended consequences. A TAB approach to accountability to beneficiaries would 
consider only the direct project beneficiaries. The question of accountable to whom, can 
also be rephrased as “which beneficiaries are we accountable to?” As the SAB approach 
has defined beneficiaries, this group consists of: project participants (intended 
beneficiaries), the general community/public, national/state government, future 
generations (10 years, 30 years, so on), and local partners. Within this group there will be 
those who see positive effects and those who are affected negatively – simply put, 
winners and losers. This section will give more detail on each of these groups. There is a 
distinction between stakeholders and beneficiaries. Stakeholders are those that have an 
interest in the program, but they can be interested from any number of angles. 
Beneficiaries are a specific group of stakeholders who are either direct or indirect 
recipients of aid, affected either positively or negatively. This is a fine line of distinction 
and not a definition accepted across all agencies. When most INGOs discuss beneficiaries 
they are only discussing the direct recipients of the intervention. One reason the term 
beneficiaries has been chosen to encompass all of these different groups is to get away 
from the upward accountability connotation of the term stakeholders and hone in on those 
voices from individuals and groups on the receiving end of the funding, even if not 
affected directly receiving the funds or benefits. All of these groups have in common that 
their ideas, concerns, and questions are often unmentioned and unheard at the donor 
level. The dam example from Uganda highlights the dangers of only focusing on the 
small group defined by the INGO as beneficiaries when there may be a larger consortium 
of people who’s information should be used to inform the decisions of the INGO.  
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The term “beneficiaries” carries a positive tone, but under this expanded 
definition, all individuals affected by the project are included. Not all beneficiaries will 
be impacted in a positive manner. INGO impact is not black and white. INGOs struggle 
to measure results of their work. For donor reports and media relations, INGOs highlight 
signs of positive impact on the communities they have worked in. For this reason, 
external evaluations have been recommended by major international institutional donors 
more in the past decade.  
Time is an important factor in terms of INGO accountability and impact that is 
often skipped in a TAB approach. TAB looks primarily at how direct project 
beneficiaries will perceive the work in the near future. For example, if a community is 
surveyed and says their primary concern is food insecurity and the INGO chooses to 
distribute food, this would be considered accountable under a TAB approach. In a SAB 
approach, a better intervention would be to address the root causes of food insecurity 
such as job creation or improved farming techniques.  Due to the short-term nature of 
development assistance, INGOs rarely measure the affects of their work years after the 
end of their project. INGOs work with people and people change over time. Individual or 
government priorities may change, the environment may change, and other changes can 
happen in a community that will alter the effects of a project. Individuals who were once 
positively affected by a project could later be negatively affected by that same 
intervention and vice versa. For example, providing and improving access to education is 
always touted as an INGO activity that has a positive impact. However, if the population 
becomes educated rapidly, and the government and economy cannot provide jobs for 
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those individuals when they are ready to enter the workforce, the population could rise up 
against the government and overthrow the same government that helped improve access 
to education. This complicated scenario highlights the many different factors and forces 
operating on any INGO project and the impact of time on all of these actors.  
 The most obvious group of beneficiaries is the project’s intended participants or 
recipients. Most of the time when INGOs use the term “beneficiaries” this is the group 
they are referring to. Beneficiaries have a distinct interest in the activities that the INGO 
is carrying out because the INGO intends to provide some sort of benefit to this group – 
regardless of how large or small the group is and regardless of the longer term impact. 
Most social and economic development projects intend to fight poverty in some form or 
another. Since these programs are generally targeted at poor populations, these 
individuals have a different capacity to question or complain about the activities of the 
INGO.  
In the rebuilding of Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, citizens sometimes complain 
that INGOs are building houses without latrines, while simultaneously claiming that the 
Haitian people need to improve their sanitation to fight cholera and other disease
87
.  In 
Haiti, citizens are accustomed to fighting the government through protests. In 2011 
citizens held protests against INGOs (local and international) in Port au Prince and 
Mirebalais, a mid-size town in the Central Plateau of Haiti, and against the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) in Saint-Marc
88
. In Port au Prince numerous 
protests have been held for a myriad of reasons related to INGOs and the UN. In 
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Mirebalais protestors reportedly wanted more funding for local NGOs and more jobs for 
Haitians, fewer for expatriates. In Saint-Marc they reportedly wanted MINUSTAH to pay 
damages to citizens affected by cholera, which the UN Mission has been charged with 
bringing to Saint-Marc and has spread throughout Haiti. In each case, the citizens’ 
demands were not met. INGOs in Haiti have taken some steps towards improving 
feedback and complaint mechanisms, but the fact remains that in nearly every society, the 
poorest of the poor are familiar with a tradition of quiet acceptance of imposed rules and 
regulations on them. In an effort to communicate with beneficiaries in Haiti after the 
earthquake, many INGOs established committees within camps and communicated 
directly with those committees. While the intent of this approach was good, as one 
beneficiary stated, “Even if we want to say something, we don’t have the chance; only 
the committee has the right.”89. 
 Nicholas Kristof and Sheryl Wu Dunn write a dramatic story of a young woman 
in Pakistan who tries to report abuse from authorities and ends up further abused
90
. 
Participation, feedback, and complaint mechanisms are all key factors in accountability to 
beneficiaries and will be further discussed in the section “accountable how”.  
 The community where an INGO operates its project or head office is also 
impacted by their activities. As the case of Mirebalais highlights, jobs with INGOs are 
one way the community is affected. Currently in Haiti, INGO operations are scaling back, 
which means reducing staff and returning many Haitians to a stagnant or even shrinking 
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employment market. Communities can also be directly affected by the outputs of a 
project, or indirectly. If one community receives a benefit, such as the dam building 
example in Uganda, another community may be negatively affected. More indirectly, 
communities not receiving benefits of a project may have similar needs that they are left 
to find solutions to on their own. For example, if an organization builds a school in one 
village, a neighboring village may also need a school, but will be forced to find a way to 
build it on their own. These are give and takes that all INGOs consider before selecting a 
location for their projects. Selection criteria and the role of community members in this 
process varies widely, but is a factor of accountability.  
 The host country where the INGO is operating, including national and local 
governments are other beneficiaries. In order to carry out operations in a foreign country, 
INGOs must liaise in some way with the host country government. Often, governments 
require NGOs to go through a registration process and in some cases INGOs must submit 
reports of their work. How closely an INGO works with the government depends on the 
organization, the nature of the project, and the country they are working in. Aid has 
flooded into Haiti post-earthquake. Many organizations have chosen to subvert the 
government to carry out their projects. This type of behavior is unaccountable to 
beneficiaries because the government will remain in the country long after the INGO has 
gone. 
 In some cases, INGOs will work directly with local NGOs to implement their 
projects. Working through partners helps build local organization’s capacity and can help 
with long-term sustainability of the work. These organizations are part of the group of 
Wardwell, Sarah  
                A Strategic Model for INGO Accountability Systems                                                                          60| P a g e  
  
beneficiaries since they can receive direct financial and capacity building support from 
the INGO. Local NGOs can either collaborate and receive benefits from an INGO or find 
themselves in competition with INGOs for limited funding, as the Mirebalais protests 
exemplify.  
Accountable for what   
The long-term impacts are ultimately the “what” that INGOs are to be held 
accountable for. This goes beyond the narrow “participatory” accountability approach 
currently employed by many INGOs and digs deeper into M&E data (not just that which 
is collected to report on specified indicators, but also the complaint and beneficiary 
stories, local staff observations) on the outcomes of projects and interventions and thus 
holds the INGO accountable to the great silent majority of present and future citizens. 
The what is the effects on populations that have been trapped in endemic poverty cycles, 
unaccustomed to having their voice heard by their government or the authorities put in 
place in theory to protect them, such as the police or military.  INGOs often say they 
want to focus on helping these people, but in their haste to implement projects that will 
improve their situation; they often fail to truly listen to what these people are saying or 
asking for. A TAB approach would focus solely on the ouputs of the individual project or 
program that is being implemented, whereas a SAB approach looks at the outcomes of 
each project and asks if the organization is staying in line with their own mission and 
values.  Accountable for what asks what INGOs need to be listening for and then 
accountable how will look at how INGOs can improve their listening skills to these 
vulnerable populations.  
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There’s a common logic model international development practitioners are 
familiar with below
91
. This model looks like a linear model, as though if all of the right 
materials can be found, the end result can be accurately predicted. Except that 
development work happens a) with people and b) in unpredictable, rapidly changing 
environments.  
 
Figure 5.1 Traditional View of an INGO Project Pathway 
The above model oversimplifies the work of an INGO project and leads the reader 
to believe that impact is a sure final step in the process, when history shows that it clearly 
is not (i.e. poverty alleviation has not happened in wide scale across Sub-Saharan Africa 
despite billions of dollars of foreign aid assistance being sent over with this intended 
impact). The model below is a more modern project management system. This one is set 
up by an organization that focuses on designing models of project management for 
INGOs.  
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Figure 6. Modern Project Management
92
 
This model looks at feedback loops and acknowledges that behavior change and 
INGO impact does not happen in a straight line. This is a confusing point for many local 
INGO staff because the project they are given and their job functions are frequently 
designed in a linear fashion without built in feedback loops, unless the program manager 
specifically requires these and takes the time to discuss this with staff. For example, 
project job functions are often divided into three broad categories of project 
implementing staff responsible for carrying out the project activities, M&E staff 
responsible for collecting and recording data, and operations staff responsible for 
arranging all of the logistical and bureaucratic functions and ensuring activities are 
carried out in compliance with donor and organization standards.  
Within each step of the project cycle, there are many individual decisions that are 
made by numerous decision makers. Strategic organizational accountability looks at each 
of these innumerable decisions along the entire project cycle and holds each individual 
actor accountable for all of these decisions. The diagram above uses decision gates to 
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identify the key decisions that the organization wants to be held accountable for. In 
reality, even seemingly small daily decisions made by INGO staff can impact their 
accountability to beneficiaries.  
For example, an INGO project in Haiti had a large M&E department with more 
than 30 monitoring staff all collecting data plus data entry staff to enter the information, 
and the information was then shared with the M&E advisor and other management staff. 
After the end of the project, some of the M&E staff admitted that they were afraid to 
collect information that showed some of the beneficiaries were not completely satisfied 
with the activities of the INGO because they feared that reporting complaints from 
beneficiaries could threaten the jobs of the whole team
93
. In a country like Haiti where 
jobs are scarce and INGO jobs are well known to pay well even if they are not guaranteed 
for a long period of time, it is important to consider the biases of local staff. Further, 
these staff need to be well trained to understand how and why they are collecting this data 
to ensure they are properly collecting it and sharing the right information with the 
communities about why the data is being collected. Overlooking this important step can 
lead to data errors. To ensure objectivity of data collectors, M&E staff report to someone 
more objective about the success of the project, someone other than the program 
manager. 
Accountable How? 
When INGO managers discuss accountability, the conversation quickly turns to 
the question of how to be more accountable? Practitioners want solutions they can 
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quickly implement. As Bendell points out, “The question of organizational accountability 
is often seen as a bureaucratic hurdle at best, and at worst a threat to achieving an NGOs 
aims,”94. In order to effectively integrate accountability measures into practice, measures 
must be low-cost and require limited time and resources to implement, ideally matching 
up with systems and tools the organization and project are already using. At the same 
time, a SAB approach asks that managers select tools that help them see past the 
immediate outputs of the project and help them gain insights into the outcomes of the 
project. As such, there cannot be a standardized set of tools that will work for every 
project or program, even within one specific country context.  
The humanitarian and development sectors are notorious for searching in vain for 
“the magic bullet”. As Ebrahim and Rangan argue, it is not feasible nor even desirable for 
all organizations to develop metrics at all levels on the logic chain
95
. The mechanisms 
proposed can be broken down into two categories: tools and processes. Accountability 
tools are discrete devices or techniques used to achieve greater accountability that can be 
applied over a limited period of time, can be tangibly documented, and can be repeated.
96
 
Process mechanisms, “emphasize a course of action rather than a distinct end-result,”.97 
These types of mechanisms are less tangible, not bound to a specific time frame, are more 
broad or multi-faceted, and may involve a set of tools. In this section, the different 
mechanisms an INGO can use to hold their actions accountable will be examined – 
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narrowing from the overarching change of mindset to more specific changes that can be 
made before, during, and after a project. 
Accountable How: Tools 
Accountability mechanisms are essentially about control
98
. In a democracy, 
people want to have control over the decisions and actions of their elected officials. With 
an INGO, donors have created clear mechanisms for leveraging control over the actions 
of the implementing organization. Yet, these mechanisms are much less developed for 
beneficiaries to affect the behavior of the organization. Accountability is a fine balance of 
allowing the beneficiaries and the donor to determine what actions are appropriate for the 
INGO, while still allowing the INGO sufficient room for their own expertise and input. 
Within a democracy, accountability mechanisms include: separation of powers, 
federalism, constitutionalism, judicial review, the rule of law, public service codes of 
conduct, and so on
99
. 
There are four main dimensions of accountability to beneficiaries: transparency, 
participation, complaints, and feedback and learning. All of these four dimensions have 
significant overlap, and when they all overlap, the middle is accountability to 
beneficiaries, as displayed in the figure below.  As Jacobs argues, systematically 
improving collaboration will lead to improved quality and impact of INGO actions within 
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each of these four mechanisms
100
. In reality, time is also a very important factor in 
accountability to beneficiaries and to account for this graphically, would require 
imagining this figure in 3-D and these concepts being stretched over time. Of these four 
dimensions, three are processes, which are more multifaceted and less tangible or time-
bound than tools. Process dimensions focus on the course of action rather than the 
distinct end-result, making the means as important as the ends themselves
101
. While 
complaints may seem out of place here as not being a process, it is an important tool for 
accountability to beneficiaries that is often overlooked and under-utilized by INGOs.  
 
 
Figure 7. The overlapping dimensions of Strategic Accountability to Beneficiaries 
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“There is a need to engage in more participatory approaches because even in poor 
countries, people understand the issues and can take action to improve development 
outcomes,”102. In some way or another, all INGOs, donors, and literature on international 
development acknowledge that participation is integral to any external intervention. For 
many, if not most, INGOs, their mission statement involves something related to helping 
people help themselves, a key principle in modern international development theory. As 
Ellerman states, this means that “any external intervention must be sensitively informed 
by local people’s preferences and priorities at every stage of planning, implementation 
and review, as a cornerstone of success,”103.  
Participation is especially important to hold an organization accountable for itself 
and its actions, provided that meaningful ways exist for those being represented to 
exercise participation in and, ultimately, control over the organization
104
. Participation 
may occur in many different levels. At its most basic level, participation overlaps with 
transparency – people having access to information is a rudimentary aspect of 
participation. Building on that, is public involvement in the actual process of the project. 
This can be as simple as direct beneficiaries being involved in the project, such as a cash 
for work project where citizens are selected to help clean up after a disaster or maintain 
public goods. This would be an example of the traditional approach to accountability to 
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beneficiaries. Or, this can be a more involved type of participation where a variety of 
stakeholders are involved in the entire project process from assessment and design all the 
way through to the final assessment and disseminating project results. This latter example 
is part of the third tier of participation, the ability of citizens to bargain over decisions 
with NGOs or state agencies
105
. The fourth tier of participation is where the idea for the 
project itself comes from the community themselves and the project proceeds 
independently of INGO and state sponsored projects
106
. This tier of participation is the 
type of project ownership that many INGOs strive to see happen after the initial project is 
carried out by the INGO.A SAB approach would strive to achieve the fourth tier of 
participation.  
A fundamental assumption of the importance of the first two tiers of participation 
is that poverty can be eliminated by access to resources and services
107
. Therefore, little 
decision making and project ownership is needed for certain types of foreign intervention 
to achieve these outcomes. These types of projects include building or improving 
infrastructure and providing direct services. In this sense, participation is largely 
symbolic. As Najam points out, in this sense “the sham of participation translates into the 
sham of accountability,”. 108 
Transparency is often mistaken for accountability. In essence, transparency is 
disclosure and sharing of information across stakeholders. Control over information is a 
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lever of power for both INGOs and donors
109
. A variety of mechanisms can ensure 
transparency of information and results across the project cycle. Transparency allows 
outsiders to make their own judgments on many activities INGOs carry out, including 
future project proposals, so that all stakeholders in cases such as the Uganda dam project 
can have the opportunity to participate
110
. This is the area of overlap between 
participation and transparency, simply sharing information can be a basic form of 
participation and also a basic form of transparency.  
Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis famously wrote in 1913 that "sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants." But in the cynical world, companies and political 
groups often deflect that light or diffuse it into 1,000 incomprehensible components
111
. 
This is to say that transparency in and of itself is not accountability. INGOs will produce 
a plethora of information throughout the lifecycle of a project, but which information is 
selected to be shared must be carefully selected depending on the context at hand.  
An example from outside the realm of INGOs helps clarify the selection process 
for transparency. The recent restaurant grading system in New York City helps diners 
make informed decisions about the quality of the food preparation of the establishment 
they are going to select. The information is clearly displayed in a simple manner (grades 
are A, B, and C). This type of transparency carefully selects the information relevant to 
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the intended population, accomplishing the output goal of the shared information – 
helping customers make informed decisions, with the intended outcome of improving 
food service quality in NYC. They didn’t have to ask businesses to share information 
they wouldn’t really be comfortable sharing, such as their financial records in order to 
accomplish their goal.  
When the word “transparency” comes up within the INGO community there is 
sometimes an ill feeling that they’ll be forced to share information they don’t necessarily 
want to share. At the same time though, INGOs realize that there is a need to coordinate 
better with other INGOs, local NGOs, businesses, and the government, which would 
require increased transparency. Much of the information that is currently shared by 
INGOs focuses too heavily on products produced by the INGO, or their project outputs, 
rather than the processes they are following
112
. The type of information collected by the 
organization will directly affect the type of decisions made by the organization. Much of 
the information collected by INGOs comes in the form of monitoring and evaluation 
systems (M&E). The organization then has the choice about which and how much of this 
information to share with which stakeholders. A TAB approach would focus merely on 
collecting the information, whereas a SAB approach would ensure that the information 
collected is then also shared back to the communities where the information was taken 
from to ensure learning happens with all stakeholders through the dimension of 
transparency.  
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Feedback and learning systems are a systematic approach to collecting the views 
of the beneficiaries and other key stakeholders about the quality and impact of INGO 
activities, offering the possibility of significantly boosting impact by creating incentives 
for staff to focus on beneficiaries’ priorities113. These systems provide the moments of 
pause during a project, where staff re-group and discuss the information obtained through 
M&E and other staff observations. This primarily happens through meetings, but can be 
an ongoing process as well and the information supplied from M&E and staff 
observations will feed into each future decision. M&E data, once collected and recorded, 
should be shared widely with staff and back with the community as well. Many 
communities have become tired of constantly responding to questionnaires without 
seeing the analysis that follows. When an INGO collects information, many communities 
also see this as a promise of future benefits. If the INGO collects information and then 
never follows through with a project or activities in the area, communities are often 
become outraged with the organization. Similarly, in some countries communities have 
become wary of INGOs collecting data on them because they fear they are spying on 
them and are part of a rebel movement. This is a particular challenge faced by INGOs 
operating in conflict zones such as Afghanistan where INGOs now struggle to collect 
information from beneficiaries.  
Project monitoring can be a method of obtaining feedback if the information is 
shared within the project and operations team. Unfortunately, due to the time restraints 
and plethora of demands upon program and M&E staff, this information is often collected 
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but not shared widely. A TAB approach would consider that simply collecting the 
information allows the project to be considered accountable to beneficiaries. In order for 
this information to be usable for program and operations teams, the data needs to be 
analyzed and boiled down into meaningful points and action items. Taking the time to do 
this would be an excellent step towards creating projects that are more accountable to 
beneficiaries. This information can also be used to inform the country program, regional 
program, or organization’s strategy as well and may influence other actors in the region if 
the information is shared.  
Complaints are a specific part of feedback from beneficiaries that is necessary to 
call special attention to for accountability to beneficiaries. The populations that are often 
the direct beneficiaries of an INGO project are usually unaccustomed to having their 
voice heard, and when they do raise their concerns via the local authorities or media, their 
situation can be made worse. A local government official in rural Haiti told an INGO in 
2010 that he didn’t want their specific project in his community because it didn’t address 
what he saw as the most pressing needs. He also said that he realized if he didn’t accept 
this project, he would be jeopardizing his chances for future projects in his community
114
. 
Complaints must not only be recorded, but the organization must have a clear and simple 
reporting system and way to show the community that they are acting on their complaints 
under a SAB system.  
Within the four main dimensions of accountability to beneficiaries there are many 
different tools that can be used. A toolbox for accountability would be useful for 
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organizations to share, or even a unique toolbox for one organization would benefit all of 
their different country programs. Dubnick categorized three types of account giving tools 
– reporting , mitigating, and reframing115. He uses the figure below to establish the 
differences between the role and relationship of the principal (donor) versus the agent 
(INGO)
116
.  This section will review a few of the tools that are representative of  the 
reporting and reframing categories and are either frequently employed by INGOs or 
becoming commonly accepted as “best practices” within the sector: participative 
evaluations, external final evaluations, benchmarking, and internal assessments. 
Mitigating tools are less common with INGOs than in the public sector, where Dubnick’s 
research is focused. In the international development sector there are two main tools used 
for mitigating, monitoring systems and complaint tools. Both of these are accountability 
processes rather than discrete accountability tools and will be discussed further in the 
section about accountability processes.  
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First, two types of reporting tools will be reviewed, participative and external 
evaluations. In recent years participative evaluations have become increasingly popular 
TAB tool. In this type of evaluation, beneficiaries are actively involved in the 
measurement of the project, usually in the form of surveys and focus groups. Depending 
on the specific circumstance, additional mechanisms have been employed for this type of 
evaluation including innovative usages of technology. However, these evaluations often 
fall short of measuring the impact on all stakeholders because most evaluators lack the 
time to properly assess the beneficiary and stakeholder population. Furthermore, these 
evaluators are tasked with providing specific information that the donor is looking for 
and therefore don’t have the time and resources to examine questions specifically related 
to how accountable the project was to the populations they were serving. Unless the 
INGO can provide the evaluator with a robust stakeholder and beneficiary analysis and 
specifically asks for information on accountability to beneficiaries, this information will 
not necessarily be collected and thus the evaluation will not be a strong SAB tool.  
At the end of the project, an external evaluator is increasingly called in to conduct 
an assessment of the project’s performance and impact. An external evaluator improves 
the evaluation process by reducing bias about project results. A complaint against 
external evaluators is that they sometimes lack the local context. When the donor requires 
an external evaluation of the project, as with the 2010 USAID Forward reforms, the 
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INGO still has the option to choose the evaluator and will be heavily involved in the 
evaluation documentation. Again, simply conducting the evaluation is only a TAB tool. 
In order to use this type of tool in a SAB system, the evaluation would need to feed into 
the organization’s learning, informing the future decisions of the organization and its 
strategy. The evaluator should ask questions about how the project aligned with the 
organization’s mission, goals, country and/or regional strategy, and values. A TAB 
evaluation focuses heavily on standard M&E tools such as a logframe to measure 
progress of the project against intended goals. However, as previously noted, this type of 
system can focus too heavily on pre-defined indicators and miss some of the external or 
tangential pluses and minuses of the project. For example, a post-earthquake project was 
evaluated in Haiti and the evaluator focused on the impact to the intended direct 
beneficiary community. Even when informed by project staff of the positive benefits the 
local vendors saw from the project he refused to include these results as they were not in 
line with the project’s intended outcomes117.  
The next two types of tools reviewed are reframing tools, where the agent takes 
the opportunity to “transform how the problematic situation is defined and perceived”118.  
Strategic dashboards are a tool that can be useful in ensuring alignment with an 
organization’s goals and mission. Benchmarking along the dashboard is a tool 
organizations can use to stay aligned with their mission and goals. Accountability to 
beneficiaries can be marked as a specific point on the dashboard and progress can be 
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measured against this indicator over time. The strategic dashboard concept comes from 
business, but can be applied to an INGO as well by measuring performance against their 
own selected indicators, such as accountability to beneficiaries. Defining accountability 
to beneficiaries as an indicator on the strategic dashboard would mean breaking up the 
concept into it’s four dimensions and selecting specific goals to reach within each 
dimension. The general idea of a strategic dashboard is to condense strategy into simple 
key points to measure performance against throughout the year. Just like in a car, there 
are indicators the driver easily reads while using the car, a strategic dashboard helps 
leaders review their progress on indicators. The dashboard will be expanded upon in the 
following chapter when the balanced scorecard approach is elaborated and the role of 
internal assessments further noted.  
Assessments are a primary starting point for a strategic dashboard; just as a car 
starts at zero MPH, the assessment calibrates the organization’s performance to zero so 
that measurement is made possible. Just as with the project cycle, the first step is to 
conduct an assessment and from there the next steps to be taken to improve 
accountability can be taken. These assessments can take place at the agency level or at 
the country-program level. This accountability tool allows the agency or country program 
to establish areas of focus (which mechanisms need more attention), see which tools are 
being employed already, and set an accountability framework. Since this type of tool is a 
starting point of measuring and improving INGO accountability to beneficiaries, it is the 
focus of this thesis.  
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Internal assessments are able to measure staff perspectives of their work, asking 
staff to critically review their own work. Assuming that staff have decided to work for an 
INGO because they believe in the organization’s mission and have a true desire to 
improve the situation of others, then this type of assessment can be beneficial for staff to 
compare their perspectives against those of their peers within the agency. This sort of 
internal discussion within the agency encourages learning and growth. As INGOs are 
working in a rapidly changing context, this type of pause for reflection needs to happen 
frequently, generally around moments of strategic planning. An internal assessment 
won’t offer concrete results about how the INGO is performing in regards to their actual 
outcomes. Perspectives can of course vary from reality. After standardized tests students 
across several countries were asked how they performed, American students had the 
highest level of confidence in their work despite lower scores than students in other 
countries. Many INGO staff who have worked in the field for a long period of time tend 
to have a more cynical perspective of their work than newer staff. Thus, the amount of 
time a staff member has worked in the field could affect their perception of their work 
and change the data collected by an internal assessment.  
Accountable How: Processes 
Accountability tools are individual steps within an integrated accountability 
process. This section will review the over-arching processes within an accountability to 
beneficiaries system.  
Being accountable to beneficiaries primarily requires a change in mindset of all 
those working directly on an INGO project. This includes not only the program/project 
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team, but also the support and operations staff involved, including the finance officers all 
the way to the Country Director. The first accountability mechanism the organization can 
benchmark against is their mission and values. The fundamental goals and purpose that 
the organization claims are directly related to how the organization wants to be held 
accountable. The actions and outcomes the organization is striving to produce are exactly 
what the organization should be held accountable for. If an organization claims to 
improve the health of children, or reduce domestic violence, then the organization can be 
measured against these goals. Many large INGOs have broader goals that may seem more 
difficult to measure against, but by asking the organization to start with the goal in mind 
of being measured against their mission statement; this should push the organization to 
define their mission in clear and measurable terms.  
From there, the organization can integrate accountability into the rest of their 
programmatic systems and cycles. After the widely criticized response by the US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the agency 
adopted a more integrated preparedness cycle as illustrated below. An integrated 
approach such as this is what a SAB system ideally should look like.  
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Figure 9.  FEMA Emergency  Preparedness Cycle
119
 
The headquarters staff will need to support this mindset, largely through adopting 
and creating a culture of a learning organization. The concept of a “learning 
organization” has been somewhat in vogue for the past decade with businesses and has 
caught on within the INGO sector more recently. This concept of a learning organization 
is based around the idea that organizations can learn, which happens in two ways. The 
first, is through individuals who learn under the context of the organization they work for. 
This idea includes on the job training and other skills individuals can learn within an 
organization. The second way organizations learn is when a concept is understood and 
accepted within the organization, such as this thesis is interested in
120
. The type of 
organizational learning that will lead to improved accountability to beneficiaries is when 
the organization develops and adopts a concept, then ensures that individuals within the 
organization learn about the concept. Cook and Yanow define organization learning as, 
the capacity of an organization to learn how to do what it does, where what it learns is 
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possessed not by individual members of the organization but by the aggregate itself
121
. A 
learning organization is one that takes the time to analyze results of ongoing activities 
and completed activities, and then, most importantly, the organization uses these lessons 
learned in establishing a feedback cycle to inform future decisions.  
Organizational change is born of tension and succeeds best 
when it aims for alignment of purpose and action and 
attunement of the internal and external environment. It is 
impossible to avoid conflict, inertia and confusion in this 
process; the only option is to make sure of these forces by 
being aware of their potential. If a development 
organization makes it possible for its staff and partners to 
thrive on change, then it will be, in essence, a learning 
organization.
122
  
 
Cook and Yanow focus their studies on the private sector, and admit that 
organizational learning does not necessarily imply observable change
123
. This is a 
fundamental point about accountability to beneficiaries, while there is evidence that 
furthering the organizations understanding of accountability and establishing practices to 
be held accountable to the organization’s beneficiaries will increase impact, the goal of 
the organization, there is no guarantee this will happen since INGOs work in such a 
rapidly changing context where their results are dependent on a large and varied number 
of external factors beyond their control.  
Measuring accountability to beneficiaries within a robust organizational learning 
culture is sometimes referred to as “double-loop learning” because it requires first taking 
a moment of introspection at the work being done and then incorporating it into the 
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system, and then repeating
124
.  This type of learning is rare in organizations and 
individuals. Single-loop learning may lead to standardized processes, but won’t function 
as well in the unstable, rapidly changing context in which INGOs work. Rather, a double-
loop system where learning can be triggered by a multitude of factors, including from 
beneficiaries, changes in local government, changes in local economics, etc. will help 
INGO projects achieve their larger goals such as accountability
125
. A double-loop 
learning system produces changes in people’s assumptions and theories about cause-and-
effect relationships
126
. This type of learning system incorporates more perspectives and 
works on a strategic level rather than an immediate decision-making level, such as 
financial data allows.   
Peer or horizontal mechanisms are the final category to be covered in this section. 
This is a growing category of mechanisms. While they fall slightly outside the scope of 
this thesis since they are not internal mechanisms, if an organization chooses to bind 
themselves to one of these types of mechanisms, it could be a part of their overall 
accountability framework. These types of frameworks have two main pitfalls. First of all, 
they are new and offer only weak consequences for organizations that break the 
standards. Secondly, while these organizations and standards seek to improve 
accountability at multiple levels, including to beneficiaries, they offer weak mechanisms 
for inclusion and participation of beneficiaries. In a study conducted by the Listening 
Project of the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects showed that beneficiaries think aid 
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agencies should work with each other, but still want to emphasize their own central role 
in the “working together” approach127.  
Havrda and Kutilek propose a global regulatory system to track performance in a 
more transparent manner using the internet. In their proposed tool, donors and peer 
agencies would be able to review actions of INGOS. Global regulatory systems seek to 
better synchronize standards for all NGOs (local an international), globalizing the 
approach to accountability and helping to define NGO accountability, preventing 
“illegitimate and malevolent government interference”128. In this way, they seek to add 
benefits to the whole system from organizations to donors, but beneficiaries, especially 
those from disadvantaged positions will see little direct involvement in this type of 
approach. 
Three major frameworks or guidelines have emerged in recent years to establish 
minimum standards for INGO conduct in emergencies with some ties to long-term 
development activities. Input from major INGOs was heavily included in the design of 
each of these and has resulted in a relatively wide acceptance rate amongst INGOs and 
their implementing staff. These frameworks include the Do No Harm framework, which 
was designed to help NGOs consider the impacts of foreign aid on conflict situations. 
The framework follows a similar rubric to the accountability framework proposed here by 
asking questions about the assistance needed Why? Where? What? When? With whom? 
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By whom? And How?
129
  Their seven-step approach follows an accountability design, 
including a feedback loop. This system lacks sufficient input from beneficiaries 
(participation) and doesn’t require transparency, making it an insufficient framework for 
accountability to beneficiaries. The organization who designed this framework seems to 
have realized these weaknesses and has embarked on a more recent initiative they call the 
“Listen Project” where they are working on improving INGO inclusion of beneficiary 
voices.  
The SPHERE project and the Good Enough Guide outline minimum standards for 
NGOs operating in an emergency context. The Good Enough Guide considers 
transparency, participation, feedback, and a continually evolving approach to 
programming in emergencies
130
. This framework mandates strong coordination and 
consultation with beneficiaries, but fails to particularly call attention to complaints.  
 In the case of all three frameworks and guidelines, it is optional for staff to 
follow these and there are weak binding mechanisms or forms of punishment for the 
INGOs who choose not to follow them. Additionally, the organization must commit their 
own resources to ensuring all staff participating in an emergency response are trained in 
these standards. While there are some applicable lessons from these guidelines to long-
term development, not enough effort has been put into writing and studying how these 
can be adapted.  
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The Accountability, Learning and Planning System (ALPS) has the strongest link 
to ownership from aid recipients
131
 ALPS has beneficiaries at the core of its principle-
driven system, calling for increased accountability to beneficiaries through long and short 
term initiatives, as represented in the graphic below. One of their unique initiatives is to 
reduce reports to HQ and instead find increasing ways to communicate results with 
beneficiaries and primary stakeholders
132
. They also focus on the process of 
accountability, rather than trying to make it an output or result. The project launched in 
2001. Results so far have been increased internal coordination of agencies from finance 
to marketing teams, and also the beginning of a power shift from donors and wealthy 
countries to the beneficiaries and poor communities requesting assistance
133
. This 
organization still has limited access to operating INGOs and donors have not taken a 
strong affinity to the project either, limiting its potential impact across the sector.  
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Figure 10. ALPS System
134
 
In 2003 leading university and practicing INGOs from a wide range of 
backgrounds came together to outline the first INGO Accountability Charter. In 2006 the 
Charter was officially adopted by eleven INGOs who are now committed to regular 
reporting requirements by the Charter
135
. The Charter looks at INGO actions not only in 
emergencies, but also in long-term development projects. One of the reporting 
requirements of the Charter is an assessment from the organization’s leadership about 
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compliance with the Charter’s standards, including addressing stakeholder complaints 
and participation
136
.  
Similarly, the Humanitarian Accountability Project –International (HAP-I) has 
worked to design standards of accountability and quality management for INGOs. They 
are seeking to certify most humanitarian organizations. As of 2010 they had increased 
membership to 64 INGOs
137
. Many INGOs have decided against this framework fearing 
that it limits actions of INGOs too much, forcing a standard of action that may not be 
applicable to all situations and reducing the ability for local groups and beneficiary input 
to be heard
138
.  In response to the 2010 Haitian earthquake, HAP-I published a lengthy 
report on the accountability of actors involved in the response. They published results of 
evaluations of the actors and their coordination efforts in the emergency response and 
also conducted an assessment of perceptions from beneficiaries and other stakeholders of 
the response, and a workplan for HAP members accountability implementation in coming 
years. One of their key findings was that INGO efforts to improve quality and 
accountability are “disjointed”. Haiti currently more INGOs operating within its 
jurisdiction than any other state in the world. Despite efforts to coordinate INGO 
activities, HAP-I finds that there are too many agencies carrying out too many 
overlapping and un-coordinated efforts
139
.  
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There are additionally several other organizations that have emerged in recent 
years to measure and benchmark INGOs, including the One World Trust which publishes 
an accountability study, Transparency International and the Emergency Capacity 
Building Project, amongst others. One of the problems with the growing number of 
agencies trying to measure and coordinate efforts within INGOs is that these agencies 
themselves are not coordinated. It is time and resource consuming for an INGO to 
become a compliant member of these organizations, thus forcing INGOs to select 
amongst the various options.  
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Chapter 4. Internal/Staff-Based Assessment Tools 
 This chapter will look at how internal staff assessment tools can give 
organizational leaders a closer look at their own accountability to beneficiaries. Each 
previous chapter has taken the concept of accountability and become more specific on 
this theme. Chapter one looked briefly at the history of accountability, chapter two took a 
closer look at the actors involved and defined specific terms to be used throughout this 
thesis, chapter three looked deeper into what accountability to beneficiaries really means, 
now chapter four will look at how internal staff assessment tools can give organizational 
leaders a closer look at their own accountability to beneficiaries. From the concept of 
accountability to beneficiaries, this thesis will now narrow its focus to strategic 
management tools, continuing to differentiate between SAB and TAB. Within this 
specific theme, now this chapter will look specific at internal/staff assessment tools and 
provide a theoretical response to the first question of this thesis: How can an INGO use 
internal assessments to effectively measure their own accountability to beneficiaries? The 
response to this question relies on strategic management tools such as the balanced 
scorecard approach. An internal or staff survey is a tool that can be used as part of a 
strategic management system that supports the SAB theory posited by this thesis. The 
second part of this chapter will analyze an internal staff survey completed by an INGO, 
Mercy Corps in 2011 as an illustration of this type of SAB tool.  
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Accountability  
↓ 
Accountability to Beneficiaries 
↓ 
Strategic Management Tools 
↓ 
Internal/Staff Assessment Tools 
↓ 
Internal Staff Surveys 
 
Measuring accountability to beneficiaries is part of a healthy, robust 
organizational learning culture, as discussed in chapter three. One part of this is 
developing an organizational strategy that prioritizes accountability to beneficiaries. 
Having built-in, regular internal assessments are a feedback and learning tool to 
encourage the organization to keep learning about its work and impacts. Improved 
understanding about the impacts of an INGO’s work helps guide leaders to make 
strategic decisions that will improve impact of their work.  
Using a SAB approach to accountability to beneficiaries helps align the 
organization’s mission and values with the activities they carry out. Accountability to 
beneficiaries is often understood in various ways by the different decision makers in the 
organization
140
. SAB helps the organization establish a coherent approach within the 
organization overcoming this challenge. SAB is a part of strategic management, as both 
are concerned with short, medium, and long term performance. Strategic management 
tools such as the balanced scorecard allow leaders to put an emphasis on accountability to 
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beneficiaries and measure progress against it as the organization strives to attain their 
mission and work in line with their values.  
In contrast, TAB approaches the question of accountability to beneficiaries by 
solely looking at the opinions and feedback of those outside of the organization. SAB, 
however, recognizes that some of the best informed individuals on the project and its 
impact within a community may be the staff directly executing the project. A SAB 
approach utilizes tools such as internal assessments to record and share this information 
within the organization and inform future decisions. 
Tools and mechanisms to measure INGO impact, especially in regards to 
accountability to beneficiaries is still in its infancy and draws heavily in academic writing 
on business and the public sector. Tools developed for these sectors will be evaluated 
here as they apply to measuring strategic downward accountability within INGOs.  
Balanced Scorecards and Internal Strategic Management Tools 
 The ability to take information and transform it into a strategic vision is a key 
element for an INGO to effect change in a turbulent environment. Just as businesses 
include data beyond financial information when developing their strategies, so must 
INGOs. For an INGO to carry out their mission and vision, including improving 
accountability to beneficiaries and ultimately positive impact, organizations need to have 
tools to measure their accountability. These tools must be able to provide relevant 
information that can be used to create a strategy that enhances accountability and positive 
impact. 
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 A balanced scorecard is a tool that was introduced in 1992 by Robert Kaplan and 
David Norton, revolutionizing how businesses thought about performance metrics
141
. In 
addition to measuring organizational performance by analyzing traditional financial 
measures, this tool includes three additional perspectives: customers, internal business 
processes, and learning and growth
142
. This innovative practice links long-term vision 
directly with short-term actions so organizations can operationalize their mission and 
vision. The balanced scorecard introduces four new processes. The first is translating the 
vision into measurable and meaningful statements. The second is communicating and 
linking, where managers communicate their strategy throughout the organization and link 
it with individual departments and objectives. Third, is business planning where the 
organization integrates their business and financial plans. This is where an accountability 
to beneficiaries initiative would be linked into the strategic plan for an INGO. The fourth 
process is feedback and learning, where organizations create space for “strategic 
learning”, monitoring input from the perspectives of finance, customers, internal business 
processes, and learning and growth. Just as feedback and learning is an important 
component of a project improving its accountability to beneficiaries, an organization 
improves its real-time learning by incorporating regular feedback and learning from the 
top-down of the organization. The balanced scorecard approach has accountability built-
in, as it closely mirrors the framework for accountability outlined in chapter three – 
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soliciting feedback from beneficiaries (customers), feedback and learning, and 
transparency (communicating and linking).  
This system is backed by strong results in the business sector where businesses 
report being able to transform their companies so that every employee focuses on 
achieving the long-term strategic objectives. As one corporate executive claimed, “The 
balanced scorecard is both motivating and obligating.”143 This type of system would help 
overcome the most common barriers INGO workers cite towards implementing 
accountability to beneficiaries practices – they are either too cumbersome or not binding 
enough. If accountability to beneficiaries was built in as a priority for INGOs to 
achieving their strategic visions, and if the organization’s strategic vision was clearly 
communicated with all employees, they would theoretically be able to improve their 
overall results. 
 The balanced scorecard can also be used to set minimum thresholds for 
organizational and employee performance. Just as some organizations and academic 
writers proposed to define minimum standards for INGOs to improve accountability, 
using a balanced scorecard, each organization could be allowed to define how they wish 
to set standards and measure progress against these, thus overcoming some of the 
objections posed against sector-wide minimum standards presented in chapter three.  
 Once an organization has decided to place an emphasis on accountability to 
beneficiaries and link it to their strategic vision, the balanced scorecard can be used to 
define and measure the concept. An internal assessment is a tool that can be used to 
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measure employee perceptions of accountability to beneficiaries and this data can then be 
used as a benchmark for accountability uptake within the organization.  The data from the 
internal assessment is a feedback and learning mechanism, complimenting efforts of a 
balanced scorecard.  
 Measuring accountability to beneficiaries within an INGO is similar to making 
public policy decisions within a democratic government. The government is presented 
with many different priorities and must find a way to select which issues to actually 
prioritize. Governments use many tools to make these tough decisions including 
utilitarian approaches, ethical weighting, cost-benefit analysis, and economic systems 
analysis, to name a few. The balanced scorecard applies to governments, INGOs, non-
profits, and businesses because it can consider all of the factors that the organization 
themselves prioritizes. A utilitarian approach focuses more heavily on the financial 
aspects of the decision and ignores many of the less tangible components and factors 
related to the issue. INGOs have perhaps relied on this type of decision making tool 
enabling them to overlook the important, difficult to measure information coming from 
the beneficiaries themselves, leading to some of the complaints today. Ethical weighting 
helps organizations such as INGOs and governments prioritize their decisions based on 
political beliefs. Within a government these principles may come from the ethical 
principles held by incumbents. A cost-benefit analysis helps organizations compare 
decisions using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data, quantifying information 
into discrete, easily comparable numbers. If an organization is trying to decide whether to 
incorporate an accountability to beneficiaries system, this information, these tools would 
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be useful. But a balanced scorecard approach is a better tool to help an organization 
integrate the principle into their strategic plans.  
 An internal assessment helps an organization establish a baseline. It has the 
additional benefit of being cost-effective as it is internally conducted and doesn’t require 
a lot of staff time, thus reducing strain on internal capacity. There is a significant body of 
literature on best practices in conducting surveys for research purposes that survey 
writers and data analyzers can draw upon for their assessment. When staff members from 
the organization conduct the survey they are more familiar with the organization’s 
culture, challenges and opportunities they face, so they can ask questions in a more 
directed manner to their colleagues. Respondents are also more likely to give uninhibited 
information since they are reporting this information only to their colleagues, especially 
if the information is collected anonymously. Lastly, those charged with analyzing the 
data will be able to present results in a more frank manner since their motivation is 
primarily to report the findings as is. While there is still room for bias, results are 
reported in a less biased way than an external evaluator who has their own motivation 
that may vary from the organization’s.  
Building the Mercy Corps Accountability System  
This thesis will now use the example of Mercy Corps, an INGO, which has taken 
steps towards internally measuring their accountability to beneficiaries, to illustrate the 
principles and ideas put forth in this thesis. This section will present data from the 
internal survey about accountability at Mercy Corps conducted in February 2011. These 
results will be analyzed and related to scholarly theory about how to best measure an 
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organization’s accountability to beneficiaries – how to take the most accurate and honest 
“pulse” of the organization’s progress on this issue. First, this section will provide an 
overview and justification of the selection of Mercy Corps and provide some relevant 
background on the organization. Secondly, it will discuss the methodology of the survey 
and its limitations. Then, it will divide up the survey answers to respond to the three core 
questions about accountability to beneficiaries: accountable to whom, accountable for 
what, accountable how.  
Background to the Mercy Corps Survey 
In 1979 Dan O’Neill was a young man struck by the horror of the genocide 
inflicted upon the Cambodian people by the Khmer Rouge regime. Dan wanted to help so 
he set out to start a fundraising effort he named the “Save the Refugees Fund”. Over 30 
years later that small relief effort aimed at supporting survivors and refugees of the 
Cambodian crisis evolved into a multi-million dollar organization operating in more than 
40 countries across the globe, now called Mercy Corps. By the time Mercy Corps entered 
the playing field there was already a core group of “major” American-based INGOs – 
Save the Children, Care, Catholic Relief Services, and World Vision, to name a few. 
These aid agencies commanded the majority of USAID grants for INGOs and combined 
they covered most of the developing nations in the world. As Mercy Corps has expanded 
into more countries and grown in budget size, it has established expertise in humanitarian 
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disaster response and relief, with a strong focus on the mobilization of civil society 
actors
144
.  
The Mercy Corps internal survey was chosen for this thesis since the author 
contributed to the analysis and report writing of the analysis of the internal survey about 
accountability to beneficiaries, carrying out global discussions throughout the agency 
regarding the results.  The author’s position within the agency allowed for a wide range 
of feedback from those involved in carrying out the daily activities of the organization. 
The data presented here was collected and analyzed by the author, with feedback from a 
working group established by Mercy Corps to analyze this issue.  
In 2003 Mercy Corps became a founding member of the Emergency Capacity 
Building Project (ECB) that began by convening a forum of seven INGOs who 
consistently respond to global crises to discuss the major obstacles in emergency 
response delivery. The group recognized the importance of accountability to beneficiaries 
in emergency response. The Mercy Corps ECB representative has been an agency focal 
point in the effort to improve accountability to beneficiaries. He led the 2011 survey and 
originally limited it to a focus only on accountability during emergencies, but discussions 
within the agency made it clear that the initiative needed to be expanded to all aid 
delivery. 
In 2007 Mercy Corps acknowledged that more emphasis needed to be placed on 
accountability. Accountability has become a buzzword within the industry and it can be 
heard used throughout Mercy Corps’ headquarters, from the finance department, to the 
                                                          
144
 “About Mercy Corps,” mercycorps.org 
Wardwell, Sarah  
                A Strategic Model for INGO Accountability Systems                                                                          97| P a g e  
  
executive floor, to program officers and even web designers. A brief survey was 
conducted that was similar in structure to the 2011 one, but with fewer questions and a 
more limited scope, focusing more on accountability in general. Significantly fewer 
individuals responded to this survey, and results were only minimally analyzed, but the 
data was enough to support the leadership team’s acknowledgement that more attention 
needed to be given to the issue. The 2007 survey results were discussed with Mercy 
Corps’ senior leadership and a plan was developed to implement an improved 
accountability plan, but the price tag attached to this combined with the slumping market 
in 2008 led to the plans being pushed aside, but not forgotten
145
. The intent of the 2011 
survey was to measure how staff perceive the internal accountability to beneficiaries 
systems currently in place.   
The 2007 staff survey showed that a majority of respondents believed that “Mercy 
Corps’ strength in terms of accountability to beneficiaries” was “limited”146. Though 
several field offices have independently instituted means to ensure and track 
accountability to beneficiaries, Mercy Corps has not yet embraced a global accountability 
framework. Under the Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) Project, Mercy Corps has 
committed to create and adopt such a framework. However at present, the organization 
remains one of two out of the seven ECB agencies that do not have a formal framework 
in place or hold a membership in the Humanitarian Accountability Project, which also 
requires the adoption of an accountability framework. The rejection of a Mercy Corps bid 
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in a recent call for proposals from a major international donor was explained by the donor 
to be in part due to Mercy Corps’ lack of an accountability framework – underscoring the 
growing importance of such mechanisms in the INGO community
147
.  
The absence of a formal accountability framework has hampered Mercy Corps’ 
ability to recognize and leverage the tools and practices that would be accompany such a 
system. Appreciation for the state of accountability within the organization has shown to 
be lacking from the analysis of project reports, program evaluations and field visits. To 
address this problem, the Mercy Corps ECB Accountability and Impact Measurement 
advisors created the Accountability to Beneficiaries (AB) initiative and formed its core 
working group
148
. 
Mercy Corps was also chosen for this thesis since it has a relatively robust 
organizational learning department (OL). In order for accountability to beneficiaries to 
become an internalized concept, the agency will need to develop its own unique 
knowledge and know-how of the concept
149
. As such, accountability to beneficiaries will 
move beyond being not only a philosophical debate, but also a series of practical 
implementation and measurement tools.  
In the summer of 2009 the author participated in a seminar conducted on the 
internet discussing the concept of accountability within the Design, Monitoring, and 
Evaluation (DM&E) unit of the organization. At that time, many different ideas were 
shared regarding the definition of the concept, but it was clear that the agency lacked a 
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shared understanding of the concept
150
.  From the results of the qualitative questions in 
the 2010 internal survey, it was evident that Mercy Corps still lacked a clear definition 
accepted within the organization. When the agency wrote the survey, they based 
questions around the definition of accountability to beneficiaries from the Good Enough 
Guide, a Humanitarian Best-Practices guidebook that Mercy Corps contributed to the 
writing of. The goals of the Good Enough Guide are similar to those of Mercy Corps and 
an accountability to beneficiaries focus, “making sure that the women, men, and children 
affected by an emergency are involved in planning, implementing, and judging our 
response to their emergency too. This helps ensure that a project will have the impact 
they want to see.”151 
In the survey analysis and report, the group used the following definition, 
“Accountability is most basically the process of justifying and being responsible for the 
manner and results of one’s actions to relevant stakeholders.”152 Later in 2011 the agency 
conducted a brief survey comparing the different definitions it has used in publications 
during the recent decade and found that most staff agreed with the definition supplied by 
the following sources as shown in the pie chart below153.  As the pie chart shows, the 
definition used in the Accountability to Beneficiaries Study was most in line with the 
staff’s own views, next to a mixed group of “other” definitions.  
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Methodology  
 
In February of 2011 the survey was sent out to all Mercy Corps employees via three 
internal electronic information platforms: weekly email sent to all staff called “The 
Globe”, the agency intranet called the “Hub”, and a web-based information sharing portal 
that all employees have access to called “Clearspace”. Even in remote field offices, 
Mercy Corps staffs usually have internet access and leadership believe staff are likely to 
connect with at least one of these platforms during the week. All expatriate and 
headquarters staff are provided a Mercy Corps email and within field offices, most full-
time regular national employees are also supplied with email addresses and internet 
access. Mercy Corps Human Resources estimates that the organization currently employs 
approximately 4, 800 staff in 41 countries
154
.  
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 The stated goal of the survey was to establish a baseline of the state of 
accountability to beneficiaries within the agency, to identify accountability tools, 
knowledge and practices currently used by the field staff, and to collect and disseminate 
those throughout the organization. The questions were modeled after the Good Enough 
Guide, a humanitarian practitioners handbook to emergency response that Mercy Corps 
collaborated with other INGOs to create. For this reason many of the questions have an 
emergency focus that may have caused some confusion among respondents. Questions 
were developed with field staff in mind or those with significant field experience, but it’s 
not possible to break down the data by those who have field experience and those who do 
not. Mercy Corps headquarters is composed of both former field staff and staff who 
perform fundraising and administrative tasks who do not necessarily have field 
experience. Some reliability issues related to these questions are that they were only 
posed in English, so interpretation and translation could account for some nuances in the 
data interpretation. Other factors that may have affected reliability could be related to 
events happening within Mercy Corps programs, such as grant close-outs or project start-
ups that could potentially affect responses. With the wide sample range this aspect of 
reliability seems null. Otherwise there were no major global events during the period of 
the survey that would have dramatically affected response reliability.  
Ninety-two respondents completed all of the quantitative questions, with 
significantly fewer choosing to respond to open-ended questions (results per question 
vary so this information accompanies each of these data points). A majority of the 
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respondents were from the field (i.e. outside of one of the US or European headquarters 
locations) and national staff  (i.e. not expatriates) had a strong response rate.  
Quantitative questions were analyzed using Microsoft Excel. A content analysis 
and verbatim quotation selection was completed for all qualitative questions. For 
quantitative questions that included a qualitative response section, only a verbatim 
quotation selection accompanied the quantitative analysis. The initial results of this 
survey were posted on Mercy Corps internal information sharing site, Clearspace for staff 
feedback.  
Seventy-nine percent of respondents are national staff, which nearly mirrors 
Mercy Corps’ global ratio of national to expatriate staff (globally Mercy Corps employs 
95% national staff). 80% of respondents work in programs, which was the intended 
audience. 85% of respondents have had at least occasional contact with beneficiaries and 
39% spend more than half of their time working directly with beneficiaries.  15% of 
respondents had no contact with beneficiaries and this breakdown was nearly identical 
when the data was disaggregated by national staff. Since the survey was anonymous, it is 
not possible to know what type of work these individuals were doing (i.e. they may have 
previously worked in a program with beneficiaries but changed jobs; they may work in 
operations not directly dealing with beneficiaries, etc.). Ninety-two staff completed the 
quantitative questions out of 138 respondents who started the survey. Qualitative 
questions had significantly weaker response counts, ranging from 32 to 75. Due to its 
design, the survey was accessible only to English speaking staff that had access to a 
computer and the Internet, which is too imprecise to generate a response rate. 
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Additional limitations of this survey are: questions that lack clarity affecting 
response validity, questions don’t elicit responses with specific tools even though this is 
the intended goal of the designers, no breakdown by geographic region or country, and 
limited to only English speakers. Results cannot be said to be representative of the 
organization as a whole due to the low response rate. Since the survey was only offered 
in English and required a computer and access to the Internet, the potential audience was 
less than the entire organization’s staff. If this survey is repeated, translation into 
different languages and, additional methods of interacting with field teams are 
recommended in order to reach a wider audience and gather more in-depth information 
about SAB operations.  
The use of a Likert scale of "never to always" limits results to be somewhat vague 
(different interpretations of each term are possible) and therefore affects the validity of 
response analysis. It is difficult for most respondents to estimate how frequently they 
actually use certain practices and tools, especially when they work with multiple 
programs.   
“I think it would have been helpful in the survey to 
also include a selection, such as not often or almost never, 
something like that. This was a little skewed b/c there were 
several times that I felt the answer was less than 
“sometimes”, but not “never” and there was no selection 
for that, so I had to answer one of those two, which wasn’t 
exactly accurate,” survey respondent.  
Additionally, the survey never specifically asked what tools teams currently use, which 
means that additional steps will need to be taken in order to find them.  
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This survey was anonymous in order to encourage respondents to leave open and 
honest comments. Relatively few strong, negative comments were received though, so 
little would probably be lost in terms of honesty if the survey asked for country affiliation 
so that a regional breakdown of results could be made and then more targeted action 
would be possible. If respondents were given the option to write in their name, it would 
be possible for the surveyors to follow-up on specific responses, such as tools and 
practices being used in certain field offices and then share these with the rest of the 
organization.   
Survey Analysis: Accountability Barriers  
 Often, the author has observed that when opening discussions about 
accountability to beneficiaries with humanitarian workers the conversation begins by 
enumerating the reasons why it is difficult to ensure accountability. “Just delivering the 
program with limited support from logistics, admin etc., is a mammoth undertaking in 
itself,” survey respondent. For this reason, the survey analysis will begin at this point – 
looking at why it is difficult to ensure accountability to beneficiaries at a practical 
implementation level. Also, in order to reach the agency’s goals of improving 
accountability to beneficiaries, an understanding of the current challenges staff face in 
improving accountability to beneficiaries is necessary.  
The survey asked respondents to describe the barriers they face in being more 
accountable to their beneficiaries. Since responses varied widely, they were grouped into 
categories with the top three being: 1) workload/time/resource restrictions, 2) 
security/managing sensitive information, and 3) uneducated beneficiaries. Table one 
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outlines all categories that were mentioned at least twice by respondents. These 
categories were made through a qualitative content analysis. Within each response these 
key words were looked for and recorded in the table. Multiple categories could have been 
mentioned in each response. These categories can be more generally grouped into four 
general themes: context-specific barriers, beneficiary barriers, structural (external) 
barriers, and structural (internal) barriers.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Context-specific barriers: These barriers are specific to the particular environment 
in which the project operates. Logistical challenges include physical barriers that are 
specific to a project, country, or region, like poor road conditions, that make meeting with 
beneficiaries difficult. Security and language challenges can also be grouped into this 
Accountability Barriers Times Mentioned Percentage 
Workload/time/resources restrictions 12 16% 
Security & sensitive info. 10 14% 
Uneducated beneficiaries 7 10% 
Government 6 8% 
None 6 8% 
Many, mixed beneficiaries 5 7% 
Other 5 7% 
Donors 4 5% 
Logistical challenges 3 4% 
Partners 3 4% 
Gender 2 3% 
Lack of participation 2 3% 
Language 2 3% 
Local policy 2 3% 
Project design 2 3% 
Staff capacity 2 3% 
Total 73 101% 
Table 1. Content analysis from qualitative responses to: What barriers to Accountability to 
Beneficiaries do you face? 61 total responses, some responses included multiple barriers. 
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category since they are similarly specific to the region. One survey respondent stated that 
there is often a “Limitation to share sensitive information. Often beneficiaries think that 
we hide something,”. An example of the type of information that is sometimes 
intentionally not shared with beneficiaries is beneficiary selection criteria so that field 
teams can gather more accurate community information and offer programs that benefit 
their intended population.  
Language could also be considered a structural (internal) barrier since it relates to 
staff capacity, but most responses discussed language issues as problems relating to the 
particular context in which they were operating (this example highlights the challenge of 
reducing categories into broader themes for analysis, since many categories could fall 
into two themes).   As often as possible, Mercy Corps employs local staff and expatriate 
staff who bring with them language skills, in keeping with standard best practices within 
the industry. Still, in rural areas especially there may be language barriers even between 
local staff.  
Beneficiary barriers: Another possible theme looks at specific problems in 
interacting directly with beneficiaries. Gender was mentioned as a specific concern in 
conservative cultures where respondents raised issues meeting with women and girls. For 
example in rural areas of Tajikistan, newly married women are not allowed to visit 
anyone outside of their immediate family until they are pregnant.  
The difficulty of meeting the demands of the large and varied group of 
stakeholders is represented in this category. This is a central issue to the question of 
assessing and improving NGO accountability to beneficiaries. As one survey respondent 
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noted, “There are many peoples in the community with different attitude and different 
level of understanding and we have to face problems making them equal accountable for 
the responsibilities,”.  
The large “uneducated beneficiaries” category covers feedback that beneficiaries 
often don’t demand accountability from Mercy Corps because they are illiterate and/or 
uninformed about how to interact with the agency. Respondents mentioned that this 
problem can lead to a misuse of information or gossip within certain communities that 
has presented particular accountability challenges.  
Structural barriers (Internal): Within the structure of Mercy Corps and the 
unique set-up of each project, there are specific challenges to accountability. The 
“donors” category includes concerns that donors don’t require accountability measures, 
which limits the importance respondents place on ensuring it. One survey respondent 
explained that there is a , “Donor-driven mentality and lack of expectation that 
beneficiaries should be actively involved in program design and evaluation. 
Unfortunately, as a program officer I can think of very few cases where beneficiaries 
have been asked to contribute to program design, monitoring or evaluation,”. 
Respondents also feel that they receive inadequate information from donors about 
accountability measures or expectations.  
Program design and a lack of time/workload/resources also fall into this theme, 
the area where most responses were grouped. This category includes responses that 
discuss feeling as though they don’t have enough time to create accountability measures, 
they are too busy to work on this, or they lack the proper resources in order to enact such 
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measures. Respondents reported feeling a lack of organizational commitment and support 
for accountability measures, leading them to place less of an emphasis on this in their 
own work. The quotes cited from survey respondents highlight the time dilemma that 
respondents feel when completing a project, which is heightened during an emergency. 
Working with partner organizations also presents challenges to accountability to 
beneficiaries since it involves another layer of information coordination and expectation 
management (this barrier is also project-specific, but is a structural problem that best fits 
into organizational barriers). This issue is similar to the challenge the World Bank faces 
ensuring accountability to beneficiaries when they often work through NGOs to 
implement their projects. Mercy Corps also implements programs through local 
organizations.  
Structural barriers (External): Certain realities exist in country and regional 
contexts that present particular challenges to accountability: governments, insurgencies, 
armed conflict, local governments and policies, and US government regulations and 
foreign policy decisions. Each of these categories shape how respondents interact with 
their beneficiaries and the unique opportunities and restrictions faced by each project. All 
of these barriers are generally beyond the control of the agency.  
These challenges above all else highlight the need for a clear stakeholder analysis 
in order to develop a comprehensive framework for strategic accountability to 
beneficiaries. Program teams need to be able to quickly identify whom they are 
accountable to and then be able to select tools that will allow them to engage 
beneficiaries. Other strategies and tools, such as improved communication around the 
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topic would also help, but these would need to follow suit of a strong stakeholder analysis 
and generally strong understanding of the cultural context of each intervention planned.  
Accountable to whom? Which beneficiaries are we targeting? 
Defining the beneficiary population(s) is the first step in accountability practices. 
All project interventions will have ripple effects beyond the project target group, so in 
order to understand the current state of accountability to beneficiaries, a large and diverse 
group of beneficiaries who will be affected by any interventions must be defined. While 
this may seem fairly obvious, the challenges involved in this exercise are highlighted in 
chapters one and two of this thesis.  
 
Figure 12. Responses to the question: To what extent does your team include a fair and practical 
representation of all the groups that are members of the local populations? 92 total responses. 
38% of the survey respondents reported that teams try to include a “fair and 
practical representation of all groups that are members of the local population” “always”.  
Another 36% of respondents stated that they do this “often”. Combining these two 
categories shows a clear majority making strong efforts to include a fair and practical 
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representation of the local population. A flaw in the design of this question is that it 
doesn’t look deeper into determining whether staffs ideas about what constitutes a “fair 
and practical representation” are in fact accurate. Mercy Corps walks a fine line in 
attempting to stay neutral in their activities and human resources decisions. Certain 
contexts make this particularly challenging, as noted in the accountability barriers section 
above.  
In specific projects, it may not be possible or desirable to include an even 
representation of all groups in the community – for example if the project has a focus on 
local government, some of the most vulnerable groups may not be targeted and 
information on how the project affects them may not be collected. It may be more 
important to consider this latter percentage for this reason. No one reported that they 
“never” try to include a fair representation of all groups. This is not surprising since equal 
opportunity to benefit from aid delivery is a general humanitarian and human rights 
principle (as cited in the SPHERE guidelines, HAP guidelines, UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights).  
Women and girls are a particularly vulnerable group, often left out of the formal 
economy and other social structures. They also account for approximately half of any 
community, making them a significant group of beneficiaries in any project. When asked 
about maintaining a gender balance, 32% of respondents reported that they do so always; 
slightly more reported often maintaining a gender balance (33%).  Many of the barriers 
previously mentioned about working with women in conservative cultures were again 
Wardwell, Sarah  
                A Strategic Model for INGO Accountability Systems                                                                          111| P a g e  
  
mentioned as challenges to maintaining an equitable gender balance. As one survey 
respondent also noted,  
“Gender balance is a tricky issue.  Do you mean numbers?  
50% men and 50% women?  That does not necessarily 
represent gender equality...  In the project I run, we have a 
base majority of men as beneficiaries; however, we 
guarantee gender balance by carefully including a gender 
perspective in all our activities.” 
In the Mercy Corps 2010 Internal Gender Assessment 23% of respondents 
reported “always” collecting gender disaggregated data, 32% reported “frequently” doing 
so and 23% reported “frequently” collecting this data (the Gender Assessment had 
approximately 300 responses. Questions 12-14 were used from this survey in this report).  
The slightly higher rate of respondents stating they “always” collect gender data could be 
a function of the small rate of response to the accountability survey, or other systematic 
error.  In Mercy Corps’ internal gender assessment, respondents were asked why they 
choose to collect this information with the majority (66%) reporting  doing so because of 
donor requirements with significantly fewer reporting because country leadership 
requires it (39%) or because program implementers think it is important even if it isn’t 
required (34%). This survey showed that the largest barrier to collecting gender 
disaggregated data is a lack of training.  
 Transparency is another important component of accountability, which means 
conducting operations in a way that is open to inspection and feedback from 
beneficiaries. Respondents reported that teams establish basic profiles of the population 
from primary and secondary sources in a transparent manner most consistently for 1) 
gender, 2) vulnerability, and 3) ethnicity (based on percentages of respondents that they 
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“always” do this). Political affiliation and religion were most likely to “never” be used in 
creating a profile of the community. As one survey respondent stated, "Why we never ask 
our beneficiaries for ethnicity, religion and political affiliation, because we are non 
religion non governmental organization. We just want secure and just productive 
community.” 
Beneficiaries are a constantly changing group, part of the complexity of 
measuring accountability to beneficiaries. Thirty-five percent of the respondents report 
that beneficiary information is always updated and analyzed periodically by teams, while 
7% of the respondents reported never updating or analyzing beneficiary information.    
 
Figure 13. Responses to the question: To what degree does your team establish a basic profile of the 
population from primary and secondary sources in a transparent manner including: gender, ethnicity, 
religion, political affiliation, vulnerability? 90 responses. 
Accountable how? Sharing Information with Beneficiaries 
One of the goals of this survey was to gauge how accountable respondents 
currently believe they are to the populations they serve. Sharing information with 
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beneficiaries is one important aspect of accountability which is why one survey question 
specifically addresses this. Overall, 26% of respondents feel that they are making “strong 
efforts” to share information with beneficiaries (Figure 13). A majority of respondents 
(51%) believe they are making “adequate” efforts” to share program information with 
beneficiaries and 23% think they make “limited” or “poor” efforts in this regard. When 
disaggregating the data by national staff, a slightly higher percentage of respondents 
(31%) report that they make strong efforts to share information with beneficiaries.  
 
Figure 14.Responses to the question: Overall, how would you rate your program’s efforts to share 
program information with beneficiaries? 
 One way to interpret these results is that a majority, 77% are content with the 
amount of information currently being shared with beneficiaries during Mercy Corps 
projects (combining strong and adequate). Another angle, is to focus on the 18% that 
view efforts to be “limited” and the 4% who rate it as “poor”. It would be interesting to 
pose a follow-up question to this one in a future survey that asks why or to explain the 
specific program circumstances that allow them to rate their response this way.  
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Accountable for what? Participation 
As discussed in chapter three, participation and when the INGO chooses to 
include beneficiaries is a component of AB. What actions that the INGO carries out could 
relate to AB? Breaking down accountability in this way helps facilitate the discussion on 
measurement tools in the upcoming “accountable how?” section. The survey analyzed 
this aspect of accountability by asking which phases of the project cycle beneficiaries 
were likely to be involved in, when project information is shared with beneficiaries and 
when are they asked to participate in the selection criteria.  
Participation in this section refers to beneficiary inclusion in various steps in the 
project cycle. Respondents reported that they are most likely to involve beneficiaries 1) 
during the implementation of activities, 2) the initial assessment, 3) the evaluation, and 4) 
the monitoring of the project. Beneficiaries are least likely to be involved in the design of 
the project. Figure 14 below depicts the full findings from the survey on this point.  
 
Figure 15. Response to the question, how often does your team involve beneficiaries during the 
following phases of the project.  94 responses. 
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Respondents are most likely to meet with beneficiaries to explain the kind of 
assistance Mercy Corps can provide, who Mercy Corps is, and the roles the community 
plays in program implementation during the assessment and design phases.  Sources of 
funding are least likely to be shared with beneficiaries during these phases. Percentages 
for sharing information about all of these subjects was above 50% when combining the 
“often” and “always” categories. Figure 15 above displays the full report.  
 
 
 
 
 
When input and inclusive participation is used to direct beneficiary selection, 
input is most likely to be sought from community leaders and community representatives 
before most vulnerable groups, although only by a small margin. The table below details 
the “always” and “often” categories from this question on the survey. 
Who do we solicit information from?    
 Always Often Combined 
Total 
Community Representatives 53% 26% 79% 
Community Leaders 54% 27% 81% 
Most Vulnerable Groups 38% 29% 67% 
Table 2. Response to the question, When creating beneficiaries selection criteria, to what extent 
does your team include input and inclusive participation from. 94 responses. 
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Lastly, 49% of respondents reported “always” informing beneficiaries about 
program changes.  Only 2% reported that “never” share this information and 25% say 
they only “sometimes” discuss changes with beneficiaries. This question didn’t explain 
what specific type of program changes they were referring to, leaving some space for 
confusion in responses. The assumption in this analysis is that the question was 
interpreted to mean “major changes” in the program.  
Accountable How? 
After selecting the beneficiaries and determining what activities Mercy Corps is 
accountable for, the next step in SAB is to find the methods and tools to assess 
accountability. Most of the survey questions asked about opportunities for beneficiaries 
to participate in the project process through: formal meetings, identifying and prioritizing 
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Figure 16. Response to the question, during the assessment and design phases, how often does 
your team meet with the communities to clarify any of the following? 
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their needs, feedback systems, and other tools. After looking at each of these, the next 
step is to determine where and how effectively they are used.  
Formal meetings: Formal meetings are most consistently used to say goodbye to 
beneficiaries (42% of respondents report “always” doing this). While proper project 
close-out is an important step in accountability, beneficiaries should be heavily involved 
in the design and implementation phases as well. 32% of respondents meet formally with 
beneficiaries to review and ask their opinion about lessons learned. Respondents were 
equally likely to answer either “often” or “sometimes” (32%) holding formal meetings 
with beneficiaries to review and provide feedback about project results. Figure 15 below 
provides the full results for improved clarity and analysis.  
 
Figure 17. Response to the question, to what extent does your team hold formal meetings with 
beneficiaries? 94 responses. 
Identifying and prioritizing beneficiary needs: Survey respondents indicated that 
they “always” give beneficiaries the opportunity from first contact to identify and 
prioritize their needs 49% of the time. 3% of respondents reported this “never” happens, 
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and 24% said beneficiaries are “often” given the opportunity to identify and prioritize 
their needs. The percentages decrease when looking at how often this information is used. 
Only 39% of respondents reported that they “always” take into account beneficiary 
prioritization of needs for program design and implementation. The “never” category 
remained the same, but the “often” category increased to 31% and the “sometimes” 
category increased slightly to 23%.  This seems to indicate that the prioritization of 
beneficiary needs is more likely to be understood, but slightly less likely to actually be 
incorporated into program design and implementation.  
 
Figure 18. Response to the question, to what degree are beneficiaries given the opportunity from first 
contact to identify and prioritize their needs. 91 responses. 
Feedback systems: Survey respondents are almost evenly split on how 
consistently they establish formal feedback mechanisms early on in a project, with 33% 
responding “often” and 32% responding “sometimes”.  Another 19% reported “always” 
setting up formal feedback systems and 8% reported “never” doing so. 39% of survey 
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results indicate that beneficiaries are regularly provided with information about the 
project in order to facilitate their participation and informed feedback. Below are a few 
selected quotes from survey respondents that further clarify this issue of feedback.  
“Ensure a systematic feedback loop that is documented and 
requires action based on feedback - between 
community/beneficiaries and MC.  Ensure beneficiaries are 
part of final evaluation design and understand results of 
same.  Ensure wrap up and end of project is done 
thoughtfully and with community (not just ending project 
and pulling out for eg.)” 
“We need to be more consistent about providing formal 
and publicly available feedback mechanisms. This does 
happen in some cases, with posters or transparency boards 
providing agency contact information, but we are still 
inconsistent and should be much more intentional. As well, 
we are not always very good about promoting our own 
work and as a result, we rarely have printed information 
available to beneficiaries about the overall program 
objectives and work-plan.” 
Survey respondents indicated that they “often” use feedback from community 
members to inform a project’s implementation (45%). Although possibly not a formal 
feedback mechanism (the question did not indicate formality), feedback as a reciprocal 
process between beneficiaries and Mercy Corps is “often” used to respond to problems in 
a timely manner (47%). To a lesser extent, such feedback is “often” used to inform 
beneficiaries about progress based on indicators (35%). A reciprocal feedback process is 
“never” used to inform beneficiaries about progress based on indicators according to 16% 
of respondents (compared with only 1% of respondents for responding to problems in a 
timely manner). Feedback (again not indicated whether formal or informal mechanisms 
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are used) is used most often to identify new needs (‘always” – 52% of respondents), 
identifying gaps (“always” - 49% of respondents) for program improvement (“always” – 
47% of respondents), and in decision making (41% of respondents). Identifying gaps 
stands out as most frequently being used only sometimes, when compared with the other 
categories. All categories had similar numbers of respondents claiming they never use 
feedback in these ways (1-2% of respondents). Figure 17 below depicts this information.  
 For 42% of respondents, this feedback is “always” documented and made 
available to all staff working on the project (“often” – 22%, “sometimes” - 24%). Seven 
percent of respondents claimed that this feedback is “never” documented or made 
available to all staff.  Feedback is shared less often with other humanitarian actors 
(“always” – 23% of respondents, “often” – 30%, “”sometimes” – 33%, “never” 7%).  
 Critical information that requires immediate action (sexual abuse, accusation of 
corruption, security risk, etc.) is “always” acted upon in a timely manner according to 
42% of respondents. Seven percent of respondents claimed that this information is never 
acted upon in a timely manner. While the frequency that this information is acted upon in 
a quick manner is low, often reporting is hindered by the sensitivity of the situation 
requiring more decision makers to be involved and the decision itself to be belabored in 
an effort to find the best response to the situation. A SAB system would ask that critical 
information be at least acknowledged in a rapid manner and acted upon within the 
shortest time period possible. Individual country programs could draw up standards for 
this kind of response to help speed up the decision making process as well.  
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Figure 19. Response to the question, to what degree is feedback used for… 92 total responses. 
Other tools: Tables 3 and 4 below outline the various practices survey 
respondents indicated they are using to share information and ensure accountability to 
beneficiaries in descending order of frequency. Meetings were frequently cited in both 
questions. Table three shows how information is shared with beneficiaries, which falls 
under the transparency function of accountability. Some of these tools simultaneously 
increase participation in the project, although not all. For example, a focus group is a 
means of collecting beneficiary information that can be used to inform project decisions, 
which would mean it is both a transparency and participation tool. Materials are solely 
transparency tools though.  
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Table four addresses mechanisms for accountability. The wide range of responses 
highlights the confusion around this concept and the need for increased information 
within Mercy Corps about what accountability mechanisms, tools, and practices look 
like. A toolkit with information on all of these tools and practices detailed would be a 
good next step in developing an accountability to beneficiaries framework. A SAB 
system would take a step further in explaining when to use each of these tools and 
practices in order to not only “mark off” steps in the framework, but to actually improve 
the project’s accountability.  
 
 
 
Means for Sharing Info. 
With Beneficiaries 
Times 
Mentioned 
Percentage 
of Total 
Meetings 52 49% 
Verbal Reports 20 19% 
Materials (brochures, 
email, leaflets) 10 9% 
Focus groups 5 5% 
Reports 5 5.00% 
Site visits 5 5% 
Information boards 3 3% 
Interviews 3 3% 
Information desk 1 1% 
Maintaining constant 
communication 1 1% 
Workshops 1 1% 
Total 85 100% 
Table 3. Content analysis of qualitative responses to the question, through what means – meetings, 
verbal reports, etc. – are beneficiaries given information about projects, please explain. 
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Accountability Practices 
Times 
Mentioned 
Informal Verbal/regular contact 15 
Meetings 13 
Local government collaboration 6 
Assessments 4 
Feedback 4 
Formal methodology (CoMo, 
DNH, GEG) 4 
Brochures, Success stories 3 
Field 
Coordinators/Representatives 3 
M&E 3 
Evaluations/Reports 2 
Interviews 2 
Not systematic 2 
Program activities 2 
Progress reports 2 
Surveys 2 
Training/workshops 2 
Transparency boards 2 
Complaint mechanism 1 
Don't Know 1 
focus groups 1 
Online 1 
Open office policy 1 
Participatory methods 1 
Procurement 1 
Visits 1 
Table 4. Content analysis of qualitative responses to the question, what other accountability practices 
do you or your team regularly use to fulfill your accountability to beneficiaries? 50 total responses. 
Mercy Corps Example and the Role of Internal Assessments in Accountability Systems 
The Mercy Corps internal survey illustrates a foundational step in the beginning 
an organizational focus on accountability to beneficiaries. The survey responses provide 
valuable data for the organization to learn from and influence their next steps towards 
improving accountability to beneficiaries. The results from this survey were disseminated 
to the organization through a series of global web-based seminars, individual meetings 
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with leadership members, and the report was posted on all three major internal 
information sharing portals.  
The results of this survey can help leaders identify areas of improvement for 
future strategic interventions in the area of SAB. Following a SAB approach doesn’t 
necessarily mean improving on all areas where certain practices were not well used or 
incorporated into projects. This is a fundamental difference between TAB and SAB. A 
TAB approach might read the results of this survey as needing to increase the 
participation of beneficiaries in all areas of projects. A SAB approach though would 
consider each specific project, and select the areas of the project where participation is 
most important. Reading this specific section of the results, Mercy Corps should consider 
improving beneficiary participation in the early phases of the project, specifically the 
design phase, where participation was reported to be the lowest of the project phases. As 
this phase is important for beneficiary buy-in to the project and is critical to their 
perspective of the project, this would be a strategic area to improve upon. The level of 
participation during the implementation period is already satisfactory, and Mercy Corps 
doesn’t need to commit as many resources to improving in this area.  
Other interesting observations from the analysis of these results are that Mercy 
Corps should find ways to increase the sample size, specifically targeting local staff. A 
SAB approach demands an increased response rate from these staff that are directly 
responsible for implementing the projects. Expatriate and headquarter staff may have 
drastically different opinions of project activities than local staff, so their input is 
important and needs to be better measured with internal assessments.  
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The barriers section of these results should be interesting for leaders to identify 
reasons why teams may not currently be implementing SAB practices. With this 
information, they can tailor their future initiatives around these. For example, the number 
one barrier was “workload/time/resource restrictions”, therefore a SAB approach needs to 
make it clear to teams that using SAB tools will not add work, but will reduce work in the 
long haul. Basically, this is a simple behavioral economics lesson that any future SAB 
initiatives from Mercy Corps need to show teams how they will benefit from 
implementing these. The approach should clearly explain that better results are likely to 
happen with a focus on SAB, and should reduce the workload of responding to problems 
with the project. For example, increasing stakeholder input during the design phase of the 
project, should reduce changes that need to happen during the project implementation. A 
SAB approach will also use this information on barriers to help staff find solutions to 
mitigate barriers that are beyond staff’s control, such as structural barriers. Some 
practices already exist to help teams with these barriers, such as guides to Good 
Governance, SPHERE standards and the Good Enough Guide for emergency 
management.  
The question about profiling the population is interesting to view in terms of 
understanding how teams are conducting assessments and whether they are including the 
entire stakeholder population in their assessments. A more targeted question around this 
may provide clearer results though. Inclusion of these unique groups, such as vulnerable 
populations, can be an agency decision, such as focusing more on women and girls. From 
Wardwell, Sarah  
                A Strategic Model for INGO Accountability Systems                                                                          126| P a g e  
  
this, specific follow-up questions could provide more specific information on these 
indicators.  
Figure 13 showing the results of beneficiary inclusion shows some definite need 
for improvement. These results show a need to improve inclusion of beneficiaries in the 
design and monitoring phases. A Mercy Corps Haiti project has found an innovative way 
to include beneficiaries in project monitoring by asking the community to come up with 
their own indicators of the project’s success. The project team has then helped the 
community design indicators and methods for measuring against these indicators so that 
they can continue to measure their own progress after the project has finished.  
Improving what information is shared with beneficiaries will have ripple effects 
to other indicators. For example, the results show that teams are hesitant to share their 
funding sources with beneficiaries. Sharing funding information would actually help 
communities better under what an INGO is and how they operate, helping to clear up 
rumors and other misinformation. Selection criteria on the other hand, may be something 
that the agency may not want to share more frequently. A TAB approach that simply says 
to increase sharing of information could lead to increased corruption with a project in this 
specific area. If beneficiaries are aware of the selection criteria there is an increased 
likelihood that individuals will falsify their information in order to qualify for the 
services offered from the INGO. In Haiti post-earthquake reports of individuals moving 
out of the camps but keeping their tent in internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in 
order to continue receiving benefits is commonly heard.  
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A future study should re-frame the question about where information is solicited 
from to learn more about how information is gathered from the full range of stakeholders. 
Understanding the whole group of stakeholders would help the agency write this question 
and then learn more from it.  
This study also highlights some agency weaknesses including holding formal 
meetings with beneficiaries most often at the end of the project cycle and not allowing 
beneficiaries themselves to identify and prioritize their needs often enough (21% reported 
never including this information).  
Recommendations for a Future Internal Assessment 
It would be interesting to conduct a similar study, using some of the same 
questions for reliability purposes, following significant inputs in the area of SAB. Later 
in 2011 Mercy Corps took up a study to define accountability for the organization (results 
at the beginning of the chapter). This new definition will help improve consistency in the 
questions for a future survey. The next survey could also help to measure how well the 
organization’s definitions have become integrated into the whole organization (i.e. uptake 
and acceptance of the definition).  
 Conducting a similar agency-wide study after significant investments to a SAB 
system would yield interesting results. This type of large-scale study would best be 
conducted after a few years of investing in agency-wide changes to a SAB system. An 
appropriate next-step for individual country programs would be to conduct a simple 
survey of individual projects to identify which components of accountability to 
beneficiaries needs the most improvement for the current phase of the project. A survey 
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like this would clearly break down the four components of accountability to beneficiaries 
and ask questions targeted to the phase of the project: initial assessment, design, 
implementation and monitoring, or evaluation.  These smaller-scale analyses would help 
program teams assess their own needs and practices first, and then would provide clearer 
results for an agency-wide assessment.   
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Chapter 5. Conclusion  
There is no shortage of critics when it comes to international humanitarian aid 
efforts, whether it’s for long-term development projects or immediate relief and recovery 
interventions. The 2010 earthquake in Haiti is a recent examples where criticisms are 
growing ever more loudly, furthering the need for INGOs to think harder and act more 
accountably not only to their donors, but to the “disenfranchised communities they are 
trying to serve”155. As this thesis has shown, the best way forward to make INGO actions 
truly more accountable to the populations they intend to serve and to reach better results 
and ultimately improve the situation of the people they intend to serve, may mean 
reducing the amount of TAB activities such as M&E and reporting. Instead INGOs 
should spend that time actively listening to the needs of populations, increasing 
participation of all stakeholders throughout the project, incorporating feedback and 
learning into future project and organizational decisions, listening and acting on 
complaints, and effectively communicating with communities about their projects and 
intents of the organization. Complaints leveraged against the actions of INGOs would be 
better resolved through SAB than just continuing to do more TAB activities.   
As this thesis has shown, the debate still hangs heavy in between academics and 
philosophers, which would at first glance provide little hope to implementing 
practitioners that they could make any headway in this direction any time soon. However, 
this thesis has taken a practical lens toward the problem, looking at how INGOs can take 
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the first step towards improving accountability to beneficiaries by taking their own 
accountability pulse within their agency. Once an agency is aware of where they stand in 
this measure, they can determine appropriate agency-wide steps through strategic 
management tools to improve accountability.  
This thesis has provided definitions to terms that are often used  in academic 
literature as well as daily parlance but have gone undefined or are used in a myriad of 
fashions. The complete list of definitions can be found in the appendix. These definitions 
set the foundation for responding to the three core questions in the debate: Accountable to 
who?Accountable for what? Accountable how? This last aspect of how to be accountable 
towards beneficiaries has been the primary focus of this thesis.  
Summary of Main Points: SAB vs. TAB 
 According to the discussion of this thesis, a strategic approach to accountability to 
beneficiaries (SAB), will yield a great positive impact for INGO projects. The table 
below summarizes the main distinctions between the traditional approach, or the current 
thinking on the subject of INGO accountability to beneficiaries, and the strategic 
approach.  
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Table 5. Table Summarizing the Differences between SAB and TAB 
 
Limitations 
 This thesis has focused on the benefits of accountability. Overall, using an 
accountability to beneficiaries lens as explained in this thesis will improve impact. As 
mentioned in chapter two, accountability itself though does not always equal good. This 
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is an important limitation to reiterate. Simply carrying out an accountability to 
beneficiaries internal assessment, or implementing accountability measures taken from a 
toolkit, will not ensure positive impact. Achieving impact requires accountability at all 
steps in the project cycle, accountable leadership and behavior throughout the agency, 
plus all of the necessary external factors for individual project success. INGOs work in a 
rapidly changing environment, one that is often unpredictable. INGOs also work towards 
admirable, though often lofty ideals, which are much more difficult to attain than can 
often happen through short-term projects. Yet, taking the first step towards conducting a 
strategic internal accountability assessment, and then putting in place low-cost measures 
that fit with the current project stage, along with a shared vision of programmatic 
outcomes, can in fact lead to greater outcomes.  
 Another limitation to this thesis is the reality that much of the funding that NGOs 
accept and rely upon comes with stipulations from the donor. This means that in order to 
truly increase downward accountability, NGOs and other organizations seeking funding 
must show donors and governments the importance of listening to the needs of the 
community before and during the design of a project. This additional level of 
responsibility bridges upward accountability with downward accountability. Government 
donor institutions are already sensing the need to improve upon accountability in order to 
increase the impact of their funds as evidenced by the Paris Declaration in 2005 and the 
Accra Agenda in 2008. Sweden has taken steps to ensure greater coherence in their 
official policy on international development to be more supportive of the recipient 
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country’s development goals and in 2008 Canada passed into law the Official 
Development Assistance Accountability Act
156
.  
 This thesis has focused on INGOs as groups that voluntarily apply the term to 
their type of organization. Achieving a greater concept of accountability within a 
community will require a similar effort to be put forward to improve accountability in all 
actors – government (local and national), businesses, religious groups, educational 
organizations, and professional and trade organizations. In Haiti in particular, groups of 
well-intentioned individuals flock from all over the world to “help Haiti”. The variety of 
structures that support these individuals and their intentions is vast. To improve 
accountability to beneficiaries in Haiti will eventually require all of these groups to adapt 
practices that improve the use of the four pillars of accountability – participation, 
transparency, feedback and learning, and complaints.  
 This thesis has taken the broad term of accountability and narrowed the discussion 
to a specific form of accountability affecting the relationship between an organization and 
its beneficiaries. Working backward from the specific techniques proposed here, 
accountability as a concept within the humanitarian and international development 
sectors connects INGO actions with desired development outcomes, especially within the 
government. There is also a strong link between organizational accountability as 
discussed in this thesis and democratic accountability, as many organizations hope 
countries will turn towards such as in the Arab Spring that begun in 2011. Comparing 
democratic accountability with INGO accountability and drawing links between the two 
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 Goody, Allison, “International Development: The Aid Effectiveness Debate,” Library of Parliament (24 
June, 2009):5, 17.  
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concepts is a topic in and of itself that was only lightly touched upon in this thesis. 
Further research needs to be carried out on this topic as there is a great deal of confusion 
between the two concepts.  
Also above the scope of this thesis is corporate accountability, a term that has 
become increasingly complex in the globalized world. Accountability within a business 
context is generally considered clearer than in an NGO context because businesses are 
forced to respond to the demands of their clientele in order to increase their profits. In a 
sense, NGOs are like businesses that can choose not to put the needs of their customers 
first and continue to get more business. However, with the increase in globalized 
corporations that have the capability to lobby governments, negotiate the rules, 
regulations and tax structures as they wish, they are avoiding being held accountable at 
this higher level
157
.  Other forms of accountability were also not further explored in this 
thesis, but may warrant further investigation, especially between the details that separate 
each type.  
Lastly, this thesis has made several assumptions that could be questioned by the 
reader, including does global governance exist and is it a good/necessary system? Do 
INGOs deserve the political legitimacy they are receiving in the 21
st
 century? As 
Anderson notes in his footnotes, these are questions that must continually be addressed 
simultaneously with the question of INGO accountability.  
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 Bendell, Jem, Debating NGO Accountability, (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Non-Governmental Liaison 
(NGLS), 2006), 75.  
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Next Steps  
 In the 2010 HAP-I assessment of humanitarian accountability, only 37% 
responded that they felt INGOs were “highly accountable” to their beneficiaries, down 
from 39% the previous year
158
. A majority of respondents to that survey were currently 
employed by INGOs. If INGO workers themselves do not feel their agencies are 
accountable to their beneficiaries there clearly exists more room for research and 
improvement in this area. The ideas presented in this thesis are more than academic 
rhetoric; they are ideas in motion currently being played out on the international stage in 
small and large efforts. At Mercy Corps Haiti efforts are underway to identify ways to 
evaluate and take steps to improve on the four pillars of accountability with low-cost, 
minimal resource initiatives. Other organizations are taking on the challenge in a more 
globalized way such as Oxfam’s “Accountability Starter Pack”, a guide to help field 
programs assess and take steps towards improving their accountability. There are also 
multi-organization initiatives such as the Humanitarian Accountability Project (HAP), 
connecting organizations with accountability resources and expanding the concept of 
horizontal or peer accountability. In any case, measures to improve accountability to 
beneficiaries are greatly needed, especially in countries such as Haiti where large 
amounts of foreign aid are being spent. As Schwartz states in his self-published book 
about aid in Haiti, “What I hope to do is call attention to the need for accountability for I 
believe that the disaster we call foreign aid…comes from the near total absence of control 
over the distribution of money donated to help impoverished people in the country…lack 
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 HAP, “The 2010 Humanitarian Acccountability Report”, 67. 
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of accountability allows the aid to be distorted into something that arguably does more 
harm than good,”159.  
One of the greatest benefits of focusing on accountability to beneficiaries is the 
increased linkage between the rhetoric around organizational values and organizational 
actions. As NGOs work in a myriad of sectors on projects that are sometimes difficult to 
connect with others within the organization, NGOs frequently claim they are led by their 
core values that inspire their work in all directions, creating a unity of purpose within the 
diversity of their practice. With an increased focus on accountability to beneficiaries, 
NGOs can be more value-driven in reality, not just on paper, and find a greater cohesion 
within their work. “No longer would people accept describing themselves as what they 
are not (non-governmental), but what they are for, by articulating the universal values 
that inspire their work,”160.  
As the 2008 financial crisis has reminded Americans, money spent must be 
accounted for. Beyond the financial aspect of accountability, INGOs need to pay 
attention to the perspectives and needs of their beneficiaries and other stakeholders. Just 
as businesses must listen to the needs and desires of their customers in order to turn a 
profit, so much INGOs listen to the needs of their clients (beneficiaries) in order to make 
their work effective and impactful. By providing services that beneficiaries and other 
stakeholders are pleased with will help INGOs continue to bring in increased funding, 
both public and private. “The fundamental question facing all NGOs is how to move 
                                                          
159 Schwartz, Timothy T. Travesty in Haiti. Self published, (2010), 3. 
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 Bendell, Jem, Debating NGO Accountability, (Geneva, Switzerland: UN Non-Governmental Liaison 
(NGLS), 2006), 78-79.  
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from their current position – as unhappy agents of a foreign-aid system in decline – to 
being vehicles for international cooperation in the emerging global arena,”161. Therefore, 
this concept of accountability to beneficiaries cannot be left any longer for academics, 
philosophers, and politicians to discuss. INGOs themselves need to take action towards 
understanding this concept and creating tools to become more accountable to the 
populations they intend to serve in order to remain relevant, provide optimal impact, and 
improve their public image.  
  
                                                          
161 Lewis, David and Tina Wallace, ed. , New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge 
of Change (Connecticut: Kumarian Press 2000), 14.  
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Appendix A. Mercy Corps Survey Questions 
No. Question Possible Responses 
1 Who are you? National, Expatriate 
2 Are you working in programs or operations? Programs, 
Operations 
3 In your country program, where are you working? Country main office, 
country field office, 
headquarters 
4 How much contact do you have with beneficiaries? I work more than 
half my time with 
beneficiaries, I work 
less than half of my 
time with 
beneficiaries, I have 
occasional contact 
with beneficiaries, I 
don’t work with 
beneficiaries 
5 Overall, how would you rate your program’s efforts to 
share program information with beneficiaries? 
Strong, adequate, 
limited, poor, can’t 
rate 
6 During the assessment and design phases, to what 
extent does your team meet with the communities to 
clarify 
any of the following: Who is Mercy Corps? What kind 
of assistance MC can 
provide? Mercy Corps sources of funding? The 
selection criteria the team 
uses? The roles the community plays in 
program implementation? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
7 When creating beneficiaries selection criteria, to what 
extent does your team include input and inclusive 
participation from: Community representatives? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
Wardwell, Sarah  
                A Strategic Model for INGO Accountability Systems                                                                          143| P a g e  
  
Community leaders? Most vulnerable groups?  
8 To what degree does your team involve beneficiaries 
during the following phases of the project: Initial 
assessment? Design? Implementation of activities? 
Monitoring? Evaluation? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
9 To what extent does your team provide explanations to 
beneficiaries about changes to the program activities? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
10 To what extent does your team hold formal meetings 
with beneficiaries for the following purposes: To 
review and ask beneficiaries' 
opinion about project's results? To review and ask 
beneficiaries' 
opinion about lessons learned? To tell them good-bye? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
11 To what degree does your team establish a basic profile 
of the population from primary and secondary 
sources in a transparent manner including: Gender? 
Ethnicity? Religion? Political affiliation? 
Vulnerability? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
12 To what extent does your team analyze and update 
beneficiary information periodically during the project? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
13 To what degree does your team maintain a gender 
balance between women and men in its composition? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
14 To what extent does your team include a fair and 
practical representation of all the groups that are 
members 
of the local populations? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
15 To what degree are beneficiaries given the opportunity 
from first contact to identify and prioritize their 
needs? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
16 To what extent is beneficiary prioritization of needs Always, Often, 
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taken into account for program design and 
implementation? 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
17 To what degree are beneficiaries regularly provided 
information about the project in order to facilitate their 
participation and informed feedback? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
18 To what extent is feedback a reciprocal process 
between beneficiaries and the Mercy Corps team to: 
Inform about progress based on 
indicators? Respond to problems in a timely 
manner? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
19 To what degree is feedback information used for: 
Decision making? Program improvement? Identifying 
gaps? Identifying new needs? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
20 Through what means--meetings, verbal reports, etc.--
are beneficiaries given information about projects, 
please explain? 
Open ended 
21 To what extent are formal feedback mechanisms 
established early on in the projects? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
22 To what degree is the feedback from community 
members used to inform projects' implementation? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
23 To what degree is the feedback information 
documented and made available to all staff working on 
a project? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
24 To what degree is the feedback information also shared 
with other humanitarian actors for coordination and 
to prevent duplication of efforts and improve impact? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
25 To what degree is critical information that requires 
immediate action (sexual abuse, accusation of 
corruption, 
security risk) acted upon in a timely manner? 
Always, Often, 
Sometimes, Never, 
Don’t Know 
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26 What other accountability practices do you or your 
team regularly use to fulfill your accountability to 
beneficiaries responsibilities? (Please, provide concrete 
examples) 
Open ended 
27 What barriers to Accountability to Beneficiaries do you 
face? 
Open ended 
28 What elements do you think are most important to 
include in any future Mercy Corps Accountability 
Framework? (Please, provide concrete examples) 
Open ended 
29 Please, include any final comments below: Open ended 
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Appendix B . Institutionalization of Accountability to Beneficiaries: The World 
Bank 
The World Bank, a major actor in international politics, has taken some 
significant steps towards institutionalizing accountability to beneficiaries measures. The 
World Bank plays several roles in globalized politics including acting as a donor to 
INGOs and governments who carry out projects for them, and also as a direct project 
implementer. When the World Bank directly interacts with beneficiaries as a project 
implementer they are in a similar position as INGOs. Looking at the World Bank from 
this perspective, this section will briefly examine how the World Bank has incorporated 
accountability to beneficiaries measures and what implications this has for INGOs.  
Accountable to whom? 
Over sixty years ago the US signed the Articles of Agreement at Bretton Woods 
to start the World Bank and during that same decade drafted the Marshall Plan, beginning 
US involvement in foreign aid and yet its effectiveness at improving social and economic 
conditions remains unclear
162
. As with INGOs, critics of the Bank’s work have become 
more numerous and vociferous with their complaints in the past few decades, prompting 
calls for accountability from all of these institutions.   
Cash flows for the World Bank originate primarily from state resources: paid-in-
capital, retained earnings, loan repayments, and borrowing on the world capital 
markets
163
. The World Bank then operationalizes these resources with the intent to 
improve livelihoods around the world. Most often, scholars have been interested in 
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studying the relationship between the states giving their money to the organization, or 
upward accountability, rather than looking at the other end of this relationship 
As the example about the dam project in Uganda from chapter two points out, 
listening to the needs of the beneficiaries is important to improve effective project 
delivery for the Bank and INGOs alike. Defining the beneficiaries or stakeholders is the 
first step in this process. In the case of the INGO that was fighting to stop the World 
Bank dam construction in Uganda, they were focused on the individuals inhabiting the 
community that would need to be relocated for the dam building and ignored the large 
number of individuals who would have benefitted from the electricity generated by the 
dam. For this reason, it’s important to expand the definition of beneficiaries beyond those 
immediately affected by the project. In this case beneficiaries included: 
1. the community where the dam was built,  
2. the communities that would receive electricity from it,  
3. local governments who would monitor and distribute the electricity,  
4. construction companies that would create the rest of the infrastructure to support 
the electricity,  
5. energy companies who would profit from the electricity,  
6. other companies that would profit from electricity in their town,  
7. the national government who would benefit politically and economically from the 
dam,  
8. international companies who would potentially increase their investment in the 
affected region, and so on.  
 
This laundry list of groups and individuals exemplifies the type of stakeholder 
analysis that is warranted to understand accountability to beneficiaries in the sense that 
this paper intends it to be understood. Since World Bank interventions will have long-
lasting impacts, the issue of time is also important to consider. The dam project in 
Uganda, for example, would continue to impact communities for many years depending 
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on the amount of support the Bank gave for upkeep of the dam. The general list of 
stakeholders in a World Bank project includes:  
1. project/direct beneficiaries,  
2. the community or public accountability,  
3. the host state, local government, any local partners involved in the actual 
implementation, and 
4. future generations.  
Accountable for What? 
  The impacts of World Bank interventions can be classified as: direct, indirect, 
short term, long term, and structural. Direct impacts are the outputs of a project. With the 
Uganda example, this would have been the building of the dam, the displacement of the 
people supported by the INGO, and the introduction of electricity to those villages 
affected. Indirect impacts include environmental effects, political effects (changes to 
diplomatic relations, also related to upward accountability), and social effects (how 
would electricity change those communities?), capacity building (educating workers 
about dam maintenance, educating communities about how to use electricity), and 
changing social norms. Each of these impacts can be broken down into individuals and 
groups that will be affected. These beneficiaries can be divided into how the impact will 
affect them either negatively or positively. In the case of individuals learning new skills 
and acquiring employment, this group of beneficiaries would clearly be “winners”. 
However, other energy suppliers, especially those that previously supplied energy, 
possibly petroleum suppliers, and those involved in that industry (vendors, maintenance, 
transportation, etc.) could suffer losses from the dam. Of course the INGO that halted the 
dam construction was focused on the community to be displaced by the construction. 
These groups would thus be “losers” in the project cost-benefit analysis.  
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Defining the ways the World Bank is accountable first requires assessing who the 
various stakeholders are and then determining the potential impacts on them. A cost-
benefit analysis for the project, including computing future effects, helps to measure what 
the organization is accountable for. The World Bank is obviously accountable for direct 
impacts, but indirect impacts and the impacts on the full range of beneficiaries current 
and future should also be considered.  
Accountable How? 
The World Bank is rhetorically committed to “working for a world free of 
poverty”164. This chapter argues that improving accountability will help the World Bank 
and other international organizations achieve their missions. The question then becomes, 
how can an organization bridge the divide between the theoretical discussions about 
accountability and implementation? If organizations merely rhetorically commit to 
improving accountability to beneficiaries, including a clause in project proposals or job 
announcements does not necessarily lead to an improvement in accountability to 
beneficiaries. Several suggestions have been made to lead to an actual commitment to 
accountability to beneficiaries, which can be broadly lumped into these categories: a 
global authority (upward and horizontal accountability), giving ownership of monitoring 
international organizations to local governments, and internal accountability mechanisms.  
Some of the advantages of a global financial authority are that it would not deal 
with inconsistencies of national regulators, and would not have the incentives to deviate 
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from a coordination strategy
165
. However, any global authority would most likely still 
feel pressures from individual powerful states to act in a certain way. In order for such an 
authority to exist at all would require commitment and enforcement from powerful states. 
This solution seems more necessary for INGOs because they are such a large and diverse 
community versus international finance organizations, which is a much more limited 
group, with the World Bank and the IMF as the main actors. Some scholars argue that in 
the absence of such a global authority, it is “inconsistent” to demand that global 
institutions be accountable to all those subject to their decisions while also requiring that 
all members of the institution be accountable to the citizens of their home states
166
. 
Another option is that minimum standards should be developed and regulated by 
local authorities is compelling
167
. In order for this idea to be successful it would require 
buy-in from local governments, as Fratianni and Pattison suggest. They recommend that 
the US and the UK be largely involved in developing these standards, but it seems that a 
better approach would be to involve a greater range of states, especially those with 
emerging markets such as Brazil, India, Ghana, South Africa, Indonesia, etc. This type of 
accountability mechanism though is not necessarily going to lead to accountability to 
beneficiaries. Local governments are often plagued by ingrained systems of corruption, 
nondemocratic systems of official selection, and leaders that are neither representative 
nor accountable to the populations they serve.  
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One way to overcome the problem posed by Lafont is through internal 
accountability mechanisms that would the incentives for project staff from outputs to 
outcome generation
168
. Internal accountability mechanisms are included in monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) systems, using a variety of tools such as baseline analysis (before 
the program start), participatory analysis, surveys, interviews, focus groups, measuring 
outputs (such as assessing that the physically dam installed), and writing reports on these 
findings. One of the problems with any reports written in conventional M&E systems is 
that they are “on average weak and positively biased”169. There are two main reasons 
they are weak: political consequences for the organization and the relationship with their 
donors and internal struggles for resources among staff. International organizations want 
to continue their funding by displaying positive project performance therefore potentially 
biasing reports. M&E systems are necessary to monitoring the successes and failures of 
projects, but failures need to be studied, reported on, and acted upon more than they 
currently are in order to improve accountability to beneficiaries. “Only including the 
immediate outputs raises the risk that the project’s objectives lack relevance to 
development outcomes,”170. 
Evaluations build knowledge about the states where donors operate, their 
societies, their institutions, and of course their needs, adding dramatically to the body of 
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information that exists about each
171
. Additionally, as Clements et al. (2008) argue, 
evaluations need to estimate a broader range of impacts attributed to a project. Secondly, 
within a project team or even the greater organization, there are competitions amongst 
individuals for resources (budget allocations), making objective information in a report 
both a liability and an asset
172
.  
Most current internal mechanisms lack a sufficient mechanism to overcome these 
internal biases. More advanced accountability systems include opportunities for 
beneficiaries to complain about the project, such as through complaint boxes, emails to a 
project manager or other project administrator, or information desks where beneficiaries 
can ask project staff questions or raise concerns about the project. Most importantly, 
these evaluation systems need to involve a feedback process where the information 
attained is used for learning purposes within the organization, which would require an 
increase in time and resources dedicated to this
173
. Individual staff members should also 
be held accountable for their role in project implementation. High staff turnover and the 
reality that many staff will retire before negative outcomes can be realized limit the 
plausibility of this idea
174
.  
The World Bank has a separate department committed to carrying out relatively 
independent evaluations, originally called the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) 
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and recently renamed the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG). These evaluations are an 
attempt to generate external accountability and also external legitimacy. Generally staffs 
for these departments come from operational positions within the Bank
175
. The director-
general of the group reports directly to the executive board, where representatives from 
donor states consider the evaluations of projects. Evaluations are usually carried out 2-5 
years after program completion, and are heralded as being relatively independent from 
project implementer staff or donor incentives and pressure
176
. Responding to increased 
vitriolic complaints, the Bank created the Inspection Panel in 1993, specifically to assess 
external accountability issues
177
. The Inspection Panel can take complaints from any 
group able to show that:  
“1) they live in the project area (or represent people who do) and are likely 
to be affected adversely by project activities: 2) they believe that the actual 
or likely harm they have suffered results from failure by the Bank to 
follow its policies and procedures; 3) their concerns have been discussed 
with Bank management and they are not satisfied with the outcome”178.  
 
This mechanism helps to overcome the positive bias cited previously as a major problem 
with evaluations. This method has some limitations though, since not all groups are likely 
to bring complaints before the group. Often, the Inspection Panel has relied on NGOs, 
especially INGOs to bring complaints to their attention
179
. The involvement of INGOs 
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and NGOs risks the complaints being skewed based on the organization’s objectives, 
such as was seen in the Ugandan example.  
A study conducted by Clements et al. comparing case study evidence finds that 
despite these mechanisms, “significant positive bias” still remains endemic and “no 
institutional mechanism to make impact estimates consistent” exists180. A recent 
congressional testimony about World Bank accountability stated that independent 
evaluations, conducted outside of the World Bank or any of its branches are necessitated 
along with increased product innovation
181
. Chairman Barney Frank, who steers the 
House Financial Services Committee that oversees matters relating to international 
economic policy and development, including the Bank, is committed to improving 
accountability at the Bank. While his concern may be mostly based on the idea of upward 
accountability, the idea of adding independent evaluations may help to achieve greater 
accountability to beneficiaries as well.  Often the different types of accountability can be 
mutually reinforcing. Whether independent evaluation would improve accountability to 
beneficiaries depends on their choice of methodology. A thorough stakeholder analysis 
and participation of a wide range of beneficiaries would improve the common evaluation 
methodology.  
Implications for INGOs 
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As INGOs and other non-state actors have increased in importance, they have 
increased their influence over Bank policies as well
182
. The World Bank under James 
Wolfensohn began consulting with NGOs to coordinate policies as much as possible
183
. 
Today, there are more than 3,500 NGOs (international and local) registered as 
consultative status with the World Bank
184
. As such, INGOs have been in largely a 
lobbying position with the World Bank. In some cases, the World Bank will rely upon an 
INGO to implement a project once the World Bank has decided to fund the project. In 
this sense, the INGO acts as an intermediary between the World Bank as a donor and the 
beneficiaries. The local NGO or INGO then accepts greater responsibility to ensuring 
accountability to beneficiaries. The INGO can then hold the World Bank accountable 
through horizontal or peer accountability in a sense that they are both working to achieve 
the same goal in a project they collaborate on. Ultimately, though the World Bank falls 
more into an upward accountability position for the INGO since they are a donor in these 
cases. Below is a representation of chain of accountability.  
Donor state →World Bank (donor)→INGO (project implementer)→Beneficiaries 
Improving accountability to beneficiaries is a problem similarly faced by all 
bilateral and multilateral development institutions
185
. As the World Bank works to 
improve accountability to beneficiary measures, pressure will increase for INGOs to 
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acquire their own methods for being accountable to beneficiaries. If the Bank were to 
require particular methods, such as an independent evaluation, this would directly affect 
how the INGO operates. Funding could become more competitive for agencies that have 
accountability to beneficiary frameworks and tools already developed. Currently the 
European Commission (EC) is leading this movement, but as the Bank looks for ways to 
increase its legitimacy and improve its community relations, it seems plausible they 
would follow suit.  
Institutionalization of Accountability 
This chapter has discussed one of the political aspects of fighting poverty through 
the World Bank system, accountability to beneficiaries. The World Bank faces no small 
number of challenges to being more accountable to beneficiaries, including upward 
accountability constraints from donor states (especially the US), a lack of internal 
commitment or incentives, and the lack of beneficiary abilities to voice their complaints 
without the support of NGOs (which has been demonstrated to be problematic). The 
overwhelming and conflicting number of constraints and demands made upon the World 
Bank and other international institutions is often seen as a major blockade for considering 
accountability to beneficiaries
186
. As complaints against the Bank have been steadily 
increasing since the 1980’s, it is increasingly important for the Bank to consider taking 
measures to improve in this area.  
As the World Bank struggles to maintain legitimacy and a competitive advantage 
in the modern era, reform has been on the tip of the tongue for many policy makers in 
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states that fund the Bank
187
. The US has been particularly vociferous in matters relating 
to the Bank since its inception. These struggles typify the competing incentives that exist 
in the struggle to improve economic and social development globally
188
. As with INGOs, 
the World Bank is still struggling to define the beneficiaries they would target through 
accountability to beneficiaries mechanisms. Throughout this chapter instances of how the 
World Bank is institutionalizing accountability to beneficiaries and future challenges and 
recommendations for improving this have been examined.  
Scholars and practitioners have argued that improving the World Bank’s 
accountability to beneficiaries will have trickle down effects to partners, INGOs, and 
even governments. Improving accountability to beneficiaries will make aid more 
attractive to constituencies in donor states as well and could increase the Bank’s funding 
because it focuses organizations and institutions on outcomes rather than simply 
outputs
189.  It will also shift the discussion from “how much” aid and assistance, to 
“where we can really add value”, ultimately improving aid effectiveness190.  
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